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Definition of the Problem Area
The state and local governments of the United States
bear the brunt of many difficult domestic problems such as ed-
ucation, health, and welfare. The costs of providing these
services tend, in many cases, to exceed the economic growth of
the communities. Hence, the ability to meet these increasing
demands has steadily deteriorated in many areas, most notably
the large cities. This has been particularly true during the
last decade. The dramatic increase in spending at the state ana
local levels has come about in response to a number of develop-
ments: general population growth, increases in size of our cities
and the accompanying need for more social and economic services,
rising inflation, and the increasing tendency for people to ex-
pect the government to solve more problems for the individual.
Adding further to the financial problems of many communities has
been the flight of middle and high income people from cities to
the suburbs, leaving cities with the heavy burden of providing
services to large numbers of people v/ith lov; incomes who are able
to pay only a small share of the cost of government services.

state and local revenues, based primarily on sales and property-
taxes, often do not keep pace with national economic grov/th.
The pressing financial situation of many of the state and
local governments, particularly the large cities, provides part
of the backdrop that led the Nixon Administration to devote its
efforts tov/ard some type of Federal assistance to the state and
local cominunities . In his address to the Nation on domestic
programs on August 8, I969, President Nixon stressed the neces-
sity of implementing a revenue sharing system as soon as pos-
sible. In a series of successive moves, the Nixon Administration
and legislative supporters introduced revenue sharing bills that
finally saw passage on October 20, 1972, of the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972.
Supporters of revenue sharing legislation assert that
state and local governments in general are experiencing a fiscal
crisis that can be alleviated only by funds from the Federal Gov-
ernment, and that the Act of 1972 will not only relieve this crisis,
but will also reduce the pressures for increased property taxes,
put money where the need is greatest, move money and power closer
to the people, and combine resources and responsibilities at ap-
2
propriate levels of government. Opponents, on the other hand,
while admitting that some local governments, primarily the large
H.R. 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, Report To£-:ether vjith Additional and Minor-
ity Vie^-rs (to Accompany K.R. 1^370 ) , ~. 9~i
2
U.S. Department of the Treasury. What Revenue Sharing
Is All About . (VJashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1972), pp. 2-3.

cities, do face a fiscal crisis, deny that state and local gov-
ernments face a common fiscal crisis and maintain that revenue
sharing is a disastrously conceived concept that will do more
harm than good. Opponents of revenue sharing also maintain that
the system as finally adopted is not designed to aid those gov-
ernments v;ith the greatest need for assistance.
The Research Question
This study is undertaken to examine the provisions of
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, discuss the
goals of this act" and the premises on which these goals are
based, evaluate the conflicting views of the proponents and op-
ponents of revenue sharing, and assess the ramifications of this
new system of Federal assistance. The primary research question
can then be stated as: "What are the implications of current
Federal revenue sharing for future taxation measures by state
and local governments?"
To facilitate the development of the topic, the follox'^ing
subsidiary questions will be investigated:
1. What changes in the concept of Federal revenue sharing
took place from the time legislation was first intro-
duced in Congress to the time it was enacted into lav;?
2. What political trade-offs vjere necessary to achieve
passage of revenue sharing legislation?
H.R. 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
V/ays and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Report v;ith Sup-
plemental, Additional, and Dissenting Viev;s (to Accompany H.R.
1^370), pp. 88-110.

3. What is the present status of the revenue sharing
program?
4. How will revenue sharing affect state and local
spending?
5. How will revenue sharing affect state and local
taxation?
Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the effects
that revenue sharing will have on the administration of the state
and local governments insofar as spending and taxation policies
are concerned. This determination will necessitate consider-
ation of the national politics involved in the passage of re-
venue sharing legislation, factors relating to the computation
of funds received by each unit of government, and the expecta-
tions of the public as to the permanency of revenue sharing.
Scope of the Study
It was originally intended that this study investigate
the ramifications of revenue sharing at both the national and
local levels of government, but it soon became apparent that the
complexity of the Federal budgetary and taxation processes pro-
hibited the inclusion in a limited study of this nature of the
effects of revenue sharing on the national economy. It was de-
cided, therefore, to concentrate on the state and local govern-
ments, primarily the latter, inasmuch as these units of govern-

ments were to be the recipients of the benefits of revenue shar-
ing. The role of the Federal government in adopting revenue
sharing funds, and the amount of money involved are discussed in
this study, but there is no attempt to explain how the money is
to be raised by the Federal government or determine the possible
affects on Federal taxation policies or the national debt.
Methodology
The information for this study was gathered from both
primary and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted with
officials of several Federal agencies, U.S. -Representative Ella
T. Grasso of Connecticut, and with mayors, city managers, and
other officials of city, town, and county governments in several
states. No v/ritten questionnaire was developed for mailing pur-
poses, but questions appropriate to each interview were prepared
in advance of the scheduled interview for use therein. Informa-
tion obtained by interview is used in various sections of this
paper, but inasmuch as most of the interviews were conducted with
local executive officials to ascertain their intended use of re-
venue sharing funds, most of this information is included in
Chapter VI and Appendix II.
The remaining information for this study was obtained
from secondary sources and is used in the development of back-
ground and technical information. The secondary sources were
generally in the form of official publications or documents of a
public nature.

The analysis of the data gathered was Inductive in nature
and the conclusions were reached using this manner of reasoning.
There v;as no attempt to arrive at conclusions using statistical
methods. Much of the information obtained by Interview was ten-
tative in nature and in any event v;as not easily adaptable to
statistical or computer applications.
Limitations
Revenue sharing as adopted by the Act of 1972 is a very
new concept. The first checks under this system had just been
distributed by the Treasury Department at the time interviews
were conducted and other sources investigated. Many units of
governmenT; have not yet decided how their funds are to be employed
and many questions remain concerning the proper use of funds,
monitoring of the system, and the future of revenue sharing.
Therefore, the conclusions arrived at in this study are based on
a very limited experience under the new revenue sharing system.
This system under the 1972 legislation has a scheduled life of
five years, so the possibility exists that the eventual effects
of revenue sharing will not be the same as presently anticipated.
As previously mentioned, the conclusions of this study are
not based on statistical methods, but rather on inductive reason-
ing, enplcying information from primary and secondary sources.
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 , Sec
.
105, 86 Srat. 919 C1972}.
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THE GOALS OF REVENUE SHARING
General
Revenue sharing has often been stressed as a policy
instrument of great versatility by its proponents and has
been presented as a program with many different simultaneous
objectives. In his revenue sharing message to Congress on
August 13, 1969, President Nixon stated:
Our ultimate purposes are many: To restore to the States
•"•beir proper rights n.r.d rcles In the Federal system with
a new emphasis on and help for local responsiveness; to
pi'ovide both uhe encouragement: ana the necessary resources
for local and State officials to exercise leadership in
• solving their own problems; to narrow the distance bet-
ween people and the government agencies dealing v/ith their
problems; to restore strength and vigor to local and State
governments; to shift the balance of political power away
from Washington and back to the country and the people. -'-
Revenue sharing as envisioned by President Nixon is the keystone
to his philosophy of "New Federalism" under which pov:er and in-
fluence would flov; to the state and local governments, reversing
the trend of the past fev/ decades. As the President viev>/s the
situation, it v/as the flow of money to Washington follov/ing the
Legislative Reference Service. Library of Congress
Resolved: That t};ie Federal Government Should Grant Annually
A specific P-^rcent?ire of Its Incor.e Tax Revenue to the
State Gover'nPiont:: : .>-. Cojlection of Excerpts holatln=" to
the In'.:ercoile,-iate Debate 'I'opic, 1"^(V'-1"''7Q~ (Document




adoption of the personal Income tax early in this century that
created the concentration of power and authority in Washington,
and only a reverse flow of money can create a corresponding
reverse flov/ of povier and authority.
The key words in the President's message to Congress
consist of the phrase, "Our ultimate purposes are many." Some
of the purposes have been described in detail and appear to be
fairly straightforward. Other purposes seem to be referred to
in a more oblique manner. Revenue sharing is definitely much
more than an economic measure designed to assist lower echelon
governments . Some of the more detailed goals and purposes of
revenue sharing are discussed below.
Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments
Perhaps the most immediate goal of revenue sharing is to
help relieve the fiscal pressures on the state and local govern-
2
ments . This goal is both quantitative and qualitative in
nature: quantitative in the sense that Federal funds are to be
added to the limited local resources, and qualitative in the sense
that improvements in the quality of local services are to be
realized, especially in the poorer states, and that local initia-
tive and responsibility are to be stimulated as part of the
national interest in revitalizing state and local government.
Ibid







Revitallzatlon of State and Local Governiiient
In addition to the benefits of immediate cash, the
vitality, efficiency, and fiscal independence of state and local
governments are to be enhanced. This goal is actually a re-
expression of the traditional American faith in pluralism, de-
centralization, and diversity. Implicit in this goal is that
there is enough money at the Federal level to finance our national
programs, but there is not enough wisdom to administer them at
that level. Therefore, the states and localities are to be relied
upon to carry out the centrally financed programs. This revital-
ization is to be brought about by providing new financial elbov;-
room, free of political penalties that would accompany an increase
of local taxes; by nourishing the purely local services and build-
ing a staff and structure to carry them out effectively; and by
enabling the economically weaker states to provide the same scope
and quality of services as the wealthier states, without imposing
2
unreasonable burdens on their citizens.
Movement of Money and Power Closer to the People
President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized the view that*
the government closest to the people, i.e., state and local gov-
ernment, is best able to provide the services that directly
affect most of the people. Revenue sharing, therefore, is to





for this purpose. Narrovzing the distance betv/een people and
the government is a recurring theme of the "New Federalism."
Redistribution of Income
Redistribution of income is not one of the goals of rev-
enue sharing to which the President has given emphasis, but the
structure of the legislation leaves no doubt that this is a major
goal of revenue sharing as ultimately adopted. Though difficult
to pinpoint, there is a good deal of evidence that the redistri-
bution aspect of the bill resulted primarily from Congressional
manipulation.
Stimulation of State and Local Tax Efforts
It has long been recognized by even the most ardent pro-
ponents of revenue sharing that many state and local governments
have not employed their tax resources to the fullest possible
extent and that many of these units of government are experiencing
fiscal difficulties primarily because they have failed to insti-
tute the necessary taxation measures. For this reason all the
various revenue sharing proposals, including the President's
original proposal and the final Act of 1972, have given great
emphasis to revzarding those governments that maintain or expand
their ov;n taxation efforts . This emphasis has taken the form of
a "general tax effort" factor used in the revenue sharing formulas
H.R. 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Report v/ith
Supplemental, Additional, and Dissenting Viev/s (to Accompany
H.r". 1^370), p. 92.
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for distribution of funds. This will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter V.
1 State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 .
Sec. 109, 86 Stat. 919 (1972).

CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND SURVEY OF THE REVENUE SHARING CONCEPT
General
The general concept of revenue sharing took shape in
America as far back as l805 when President Jefferson in his
second inaugural address urged that Federal revenue be used
among the states for canals, rivers, roads, arts, education
and other great objects within each state. However, this con-
cept received little serious consideration for another century
and a half. Though the Federal Government long ago established
a system of grants-in-aid to states, funds transferred to the
states under this program xvere allocated for specific projects
and there v;as no attempt to use the grants-in-aid system as a
form of revenue sharing over which the states could exercise
control. In the 1950's and 1960's a resurgence of interest in
a system of Federal revenue sharing arose amidst both academic
and political leaders. No concrete results in the form of legis-
lation took place during these tv/o decades, but the interest in
such a plan v;as sustained, and gradually more influential people
perceived the need for some form of revenue sharing as essential
Executive Office of the President. The Domestic Council
The History of Revenue Sharing . Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971, p. 1.
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to national and local government Interests.
America has changed radically during the past few decades,
particularly since World War II. The economic, social, and pol-
itical developments of this period have greatly enhanced the fiscal
position of the national government and have resulted in the flow
of vast political povrer to the . Federal government. At the same
time, the forces that brought about these changes have contri-
buted to the plight of the state and local governments. The net
result has been the creation of what has been called "the fiscal
2
mis-match." In other v;ords, there has been a reversal in the
fiscal relationships betv/een the Federal government and the state
and local governments. For example, in 1930 state and local gov-
ernments collected more taxes than the Federal governmenr; roday,
however, 'Che Federal government collects two-thirds of all taxes.
Prior to 19^0, the Federal government devoted over 80 percent of
its budget to domestic purposes, but today only 44 percent of the
Federal budget goes for domestic purposes. One factor has re-
mained constant while this .reversal of roles took place: the
American people still look to the state and local governments for
social and educational services.
While political pov/er and funds generated by taxation have
become concentrated at the national level, drastic changes in
National League of Cities - U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Support Revenue Sharing . Washington, D.C., 1972, p. l4.
^Ibid.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc. V/hy Revenue
Sharing? . V/ashington, D.C., 1972, p. 7.
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patterns of living have rapidly increased the urbanization of
American society, resulting in the demand for more extensive
social, vj-elfare, and educational services at the local level.
The continuation of the Industrial Revolution, particularly the
rapid industrialization of agriculture, created a rural-to-urban
migration that has resulted in an increasing concentration of
unskilled v;orkers in the urban centers, which, in turn, has
caused middle and upper income groups to congregate in the suburbs.
Other factors have aggravated this polarization of the poor, un-
skilled vrorkers in the core cities and the middle and upper income
groups in. the suburbs. Fragmentation of the national welfare
system allowed many states to pay only a fraction of the relief
that was being paid in other states, thus creating a migration
from the rural South to the industrialized cities of the North.
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) policies contributed to urban
sprawl and the flight to the suburbs of the middle and upper in-
come groups by subsidizing more than ten times as many units of
housing in the suburbs than in the inner city. The national high-
way program further stimulated the suburban exodus by the con-
struction of endless freeway systems while ignoring the need for
urban mass transit. Therefore, national policies have contributed
2
to the steady deterioration of the nation's cities. The demand
for services in the cities remains high, but the populations
thereof are able to pay only a small share of the expenses.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc. VJhy Revenue
Sharing ?, v/ashington, D.C
.





It was the plight of the large cities that sparked the
drive for a system of Federal revenue sharing, though as we
shall see later, the system as ultimately adopted does not give
particular emphasis to solving the cities' fiscal problems. In
presenting his revenue sharing proposal to Congress, President
Nixon stated:
The growing fiscal crisis... in our states and communities
is the result in large measure of a fiscal mismatch; needs
grov/ fastest at one level while the revenues grow fastest
at the other. This fiscal mismatch is accompanied, in turn,
by an "efficiency mism.atch"; taxes are collected most
efficiently by the highly centralized Federal tax system
while public funds are often spent most efficiently when
decisions are made by state and local authorities. What is
needed, then, is a program under which we can enjoy the
best of both worlds, a program that will combine the ef-
ficiencies decentralized expenditure. What is needed, in
short, is a program for sharing Federal tax revenues with
state and local governments.
Sources of Revenue of State and Local Governments
State and local governments rely heavily on property and
sales taxes for revenues, and for this reason additional tax re-
venues have recently become increasingly difficult to obtain.
Inasmuch as these revenue sources do not increase rapidly as
income levels rise, revenue increases must be obtained through
rate increases, a politically distasteful and dangerous course
of action at the lov/er levels of government.
For many core cities the financial problems are partic-
ularly acute. The movement of middle income and high income
Executive Office of the President. The Domsstic Council
The History of Revenue Sharing . Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971, p. 16.^
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people to the suburbs has resulted in a dwindling tax base for
the cities. Another factor aggravating this situation is that
some states and localities have not made effective use of the
revenue resources available to them. There are substantial varia-
tions in the tax effort made by the various states and localities,
In 1970 state and local governments derived about 7^
percent of their total tax revenue from property and sales taxes-
sources whose yields rise only about proportionately v;ith in-
creases in income levels. In contrast, state and local income
taxes—the taxes v/hose yields rise relatively rapidly as income
levels increase—accounted for only about 17 percent of their
total tax revenue.
Local governments are much more restricted in the tax-
ation measures available to them than are the state governments.
Even with heavy sales taxes and local property taxes, local gov-
ernments in some cases are not able to provide the services ex-
pected by the communities. This is particularly true in the
large cities. State governjnents , on the other hand, are exper-
iencing surplus budgets at present, and miany could increase their
revenues even more through m^ore effective use of the state income
2
tax, etc .
H.R; 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Conm.ittee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Report •.'ith
SupDlem.ental , Additional, and Dissenting Viev:s (to Accoripany
K.r". 14370), p. 5.
2
"The Fiscal Forecast Is Fine for the States," Business




Since some local governments clearly are In need of ad-
ditional sources of revenues, and since the states are in a
position to raise these revenues, it seems incumbent upon the
state governments to assist the local governments, rather than
expecting the Federal government to do so. In any event, it is
clear that Federal revenue sharing is not the only remaining
solution to the problems of the big cities.
Fiscal Situation of State and Local Governments
It is difficult to generalize about the fiscal situation
of state and local governments, inasmuch as .there are almost
39,000 units of local government in addition to the 50 state
governments. The governmen'f"s with the severest fiscal situation,
hov/ever, are the large cities. The migration of low income groups
to the cities, the departure of the higher income groups there-
from, and the limited taxation measures available to the cities
have already been discussed. Most state and local governments,
exclusive of the large cities, however, are not experiencing
riscal difficulties that cannot be solved by taking reasonable
measures within their authority.
As a matter of fact, most state governments have operated
with a small budgetary balance in the past few years. There v;ere
17 states that experienced a deficit in 1968, 8 in I969, and l4
in 1970. Furthermore, most of those with deficits v;ere only
U.S. Department of the Treasury. VHiat Revenue Sharinr,




slightly in the red. In the acc^^ecate, state govern-
ments in 1970 received revenues of $1.30.8 billion and expended
$131.3 billion, for a deficit of only a half billion dollars. "
Compared to the Federal deficit, a half billion dollar deficit
in the state governments is insignificant, even taking into con-
sideration the difference in levels of receipts and expenditures.
Several states are realizing a very substantial surplus
in their budgets. Florida, for example, a state that has no per-
sonal income tax and a modest sales tax of h percent, has a pro-
2jected surplus of $300 million for the 1973 fiscal year. This
surplus results primarily from revenue from 'a recently adopted
corporate income tax and $38 million to be received from Federal
revenue sharing. Clearly this is a state that can do quite
nicely without the revenue sharing funds.
Maryland's Governor Marvin Mandel recently asked the state
legislature for a $2,467 billion budget that represents a 13.7
percent rise over the current budget and projects a $39,588 sur-
plus v;ith no tax increases to be imposed. This represents a
razor-thin surplus, to be sure, but it nevertheless demonstrates
the ability of that state to meet its obligations without exper-
iencing a deficit. In general there is no reason to doubt that
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1970-1972 , Washington, D.C.
^The Tampa Tribune
,
December I8, 1972, p. 1, Col. 6-8.
^ Ibid .
The V/ashington Star-IIews , January 17, 1973, p. 1 Col. 5-7.
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state governments can continue to carry out their responsibilities
within the revenue generating measures available to them.
In contrast to the relative v;ell being of the states, 13
of the 25 largest cities experienced deficits in 196?, 1^ in 1968,
15 in 1969, and 17 in 1970. The large cities, therefore, are
the units of government that are experiencing the most severe
fiscal difficulties. Their tax base is limited, the demand for
services ever increasing, and their ability to finance budgetary
deficits restricted.
Evolution of Federal Revenue Sharing
The social and economic conditions contributing to the
fiscal difficulties of the large cities have been mentioned.
This section will discuss some of the political history of revenue
sharing concepts and the major Congressional hurdles that were
surmounted before passage of the 1972 Act could be achieved.
Chapter IV will deal with the various revenue sharing bills that
were introduced in Congress and trace the political process that
ultimately produced the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972.
Though the concept of some type of sharing of Federal
revenues by the national government with state and local govern-
ments can be traced back to Jefferson's days, the first revenue
sharing bill vras introduced in 19 58 by Congressman Melvin Laird
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1969-1972, V/ashington, D.C.
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of Wisconsin. There was little support for this idea at that
time and the bill never reached the floor of the House of Rep-
resentatives .
In i960 economist Walter W. Heller of the University of
Minnesota developed the "Heller Plan" under which a system of
revenue sharing v;ould be used to channel funds to state govern-
2
ments . The states in turn would develop a plan for assisting
the cities, towns, and counties. This plan did not attract a
great deal of attention at first, but as Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisors during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration
(1961-196^), Mr. Heller advocated revenue sharing within high
3policy circles of government. In 1964 President Johnson in-
structed economist Joseph A. Pechman to prepare a report on re-
venue sharing. The contents of this report were never publicized,
4
the President declining to release it.
Support for revenue sharing continued to gather. In I965
The Ripon Society, a liberal Republican group, endorsed the
concept of revenue sharing, and during the 90th Congress (1967-
1968) over 100 bills viere introduced proposing more than 30
1
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin
,
Movember 1972, Vol. 1, No. 1, Washington, D.C., p. 1.^
2Executive Office of the President. The Domestic Council.
The History of Revenue Sharing . Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971, p. 2.
^Ibid.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin
, Hovember 1972, Vol. l,^No. 1, V/ashington, D.C., p. 1.
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different types of revenue sharing programs. Again, none of
these bills ever reached the House floor, but It became apparent
that some form of revenue sharing v:as Inevitable within the next
few years
.
Seizing the opportunity of the times, national associa-
tions of state, county, and city officials adopted policy posi-
tions favoring enactment of a revenue sharing program. In the
1968 election campaign both Republicans and Democrats included
revenue sharing planks in their platforms and both presidential
2
candidates publicly supported revenue sharing.
Following his election to the Presidency, Mr. Nixon moved
quickly to implement his ideas of the "New Federalism," revenue
sharing being central to his concept of returning both money ana
authority to the lower levels of government. In the spring of
1969, President Nixon and state and local government officials
announced agreement on the basic provisions of a revenue sharing
program, and on August 8, I969, the President outlined his program
in a nation-wide television address. His stated purpose v/as to
relieve state and local fiscal crises, reduce pressure for in-
creased property taxes, put money where the need is greatest,
move money and power closer to the people, and combine resources
and responsibilities at appropriate levels of governm.ent.
At this particular point, there was no enthusiasm at all








''Executive Office of the President. The Domestic Council.
The History of Revenue Sharing . V/ashlngton, D.C.; Government
Printing Office, 1971, p. 2.

23
Means Committee chaired by the pov/erful Wilbur Mills of Arkansas.
The reaction in the Senate was much more favorable, however. On
September 22, 1969, only six v;eeks after President Nixon's nation-
wide address, the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, chaired by Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, began hearings
2
on several revenue sharing proposals. Though revenue sharing
legislation, like all revenue programs, must originate in the
House, Muskie's subcommittee succeeded in focusing public at-
tention on the program.
In the spring of 1970 more than 2,000 state, city and
county officials visited their Congressmen to press for sup-
3
port of the revenue sharing program. They publicly urged Con-
gressman Mills to hold committee hearings, but Mr. Mills responded
that the committee was busy with many other pieces of legislation
having high national priority. Additional pressure was clearly
needed if the House Ways and Means Committee was going to be
forced to act on revenue sharing proposals.
On June 2^, 1970, the President renewed the revenue
sharing drive by publicly releasing a memorandum to senior ad-
ministration officials urging them to espouse the program at
5
every opportunity. In the fall of 1970 state, city, and county
officials solicited commitments for the program from over 200
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin , November 1972, Vol. 1, IIo . 1, V/ashington, D.C., p. 7.
2 3^
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid .
5Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin, November 1972, Vol. 1, No. 1, VJashington, D.C., p. 7.
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Congressmen and 59 Senators, In another nation-wide television
2
address in December 1970, President Nixon stated:
There is nothing I feel more strongly about than the
proposal for revenue sharing—the new one that I will
be submitting to Congress,
Early in 1971 the Ilixon Administration began to push
harder for the revenue sharing program. In his State of the
Union Message, President Nixon announced a new revenue sharing
program budgeted for about $5 billion, ten times more than the
Administration's first proposal. Congressman Mills immediately
announced his strong opposition to the bill. At this point the
U.S. Conference of Mayors began to organize -the Legislative
Action Committee to focus public attention on critical issues
facing American cities and bring pressure on Congress to act.
The intense lobbying by the U.S. Conference of Mayors began to
bear fruit. The Legislative Action Committee traveled throughout
the country in 1971 and 1972 explaining to the media and local
citizenry the absolute necessity, as they saw it, for cities to
have revenue sharing.
All these forces soon had an affect. On April 22, 1971,
Mr, Lawrence O'brien, Chairman of the Democratic National Com-
mittee, called a meeting in the Capital of Democratic governors.
''' Ibid . ^Ibld .
-^"Text of President's Message on Revenue Sharing,"
Congressional Quarterly, V/eekly Repor t, February 12, 1971, Vol.
XXIX, No. 7, p. 392.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin, November 1972, Vol. 1, No. 1, Washington, D.C., p. 7.
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mayors. Senate and House leadership to discuss domestic prop;rams.
Including revenue sharing, and on May 11, 1971, Chairman Mills
announced that the House V/ays and Means Committee v/ould hold
public hearings on revenue sharing beginning June 2, 1971.
During the hearings in June 1971, before the House Ways
and Means Committee, Chairman Mills, v;hlle objecting to the
Administration's general revenue sharing plan, reluctantly agreed
to support a program of his ov/n design to aid state and local
^ 2governments.
On June 22, 1972, the House of Representatives approved
the revenue sharing bill as constructed by Mr. Mills, and on
3September 12, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 6^ to 20.
About a month later both the Senate and the House accepted the
Conference Committee's report and on October 20, 1972, President




-^"Senate Revenue-Sharing Bill Favors Small, Rural States,"
Congressional Quarterly, V/eekly Report , September l6, 1972,
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CHAPTER IV
POLITICAL ACCOMODATIONS LEADING TO PASSAGE
OF THE REVENUE SHARING ACT
In Chapter III a brief discussion v;as presented that
traced some of the important milestones in the evolution of
Federal revenue sharing. It was pointed out that President
Nixon had become an early advocate of this plan for assisting
the lower level governments, but that no progress was made toward
implementation of that goal through the Congressional process
until mounting pressure was brought to bear through intense
lobbying of organizations representing officials of state, county,
and local governments. This chapter will trace the tortuous
path of revenue sharing legislation through the various Congres-
sional channels and identify the compromises and adjustments
that took place before the bill became law.
President Nixon* s Initial Proposal
Pr-esident Nixon adopted his original revenue sharing plan
from a proposal v:hich gained currency during the Johnson Admin-
istration. This vjas the "Heller Plan" referred to in the previous
chapter. I-Ir. Johnson never accepted it publicly, possibly
Legislative Reference Service. Library of Congress,
op. cit
. ,




because he saw no opportunity to implement it in the face of the
budget deficits brought about by the Vietnam War.
Borrowing generously from the "Heller Plan," Mr. Nixon
formulated his original program in early I969, presenting it to
the country in a television address on August 8 of that year,
1
The key provisions of this original plan were:
(1) Earmarking of a small but grov;ing proportion of
Federal revenues annually to be returned to state and
local governments almost without restrictions on its use.
(2) Allocation among states chiefly according to popu-
lation but i\rith a factor to reflect and provide incen-
tive for revenue-raising efforts by individual states.
(3) Allocation of about 30 percent of each state's share
to its general local governments, according to their
revenue-raising efforts.
(4) The expenditure of $500 million in FY '71 and the
raising of this amount to approximately $5 billion by
FY '76. These sums were geared to anticipated budgetary
surpluses.
President Nixon's plan was incorporated in bills (S 29^8
and HR 13982) introduced during the 91st Congress, but they miet
opposition from the two ranking members of the Ways and Means
Committee, which handles tax and revenue legislation. Chairman
Wilbur D. Mills, joined by John W. Byrnes, the ranking Republican
of the Ways and Means Committee, opposed uncontrolled state or
local use of funds raised through Federal taxation. Chairman
Russell B. Long of the Senate Finance Committee expressed oppos-
ition to the plan on the grounds that there v;ere no surplus
"Revenue Sharing: Bitter Battle Looms in Congress,"
Congress lonal Quarterly, Weekly Report , January 29, 1971,




revenues to share. Neither bill v;as acted upon.
Other Proposals
In the weeks following the President's initial proposal,
revenue sharing gained substantial support from state and local
officials, the public, and many members of Congress, despite the
opposition of key committee leaders. Administration officials
led by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Assistant Treasury Secretary for
economic policy, met December 6 with state and local officials
during a National League of Cities conference in Atlanta, Georgia.
At this meeting details for a modified revenue sharing program
were worked out, along with an agreement for stepping up the
drive for Congressional action on the plan.
In the meantime various Senators and Representatives fav-
oring revenue sharing began to assimilate their own bills, de-
signed in most cases to give maximum advantage to their own con-
stituencies. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine
each of these in detail, but the more important ones v/ill be dis-
cussed to demonstrate their impact on the bill that ultimately
vjas enacted.
Beginning in late I969 the Senate Government Operations
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations chaired by Senator
Edmund S. Muskie held hearings on a revenue sharing bill (S 2483)
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) of
which he was a member. This bill never reached the Senate
floor, but it is important to note that Senator Muskie, at that
time widely regarded as the brightest presidential prospect in
the Democratic Party, was an early advocate of some type of re-
venue sharing. Senator Muskie introduced a quite similar bill
(S 1770) in 1971.
Almost simultaneously with the disclosure of the new
program worked out by Wiedenbaum on behalf of the Administration,
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Representative Henry S. Reuss
introduced identical revenue sharing bills in the Senate and
House, respectively, containing some elements of similarity to
3
and some marked differences from the Administration plan. They
announced their proposal in December 1970, whereas Mr, Nixon's
official message for his new revenue sharing program was not
delivered until February 4, 1971. His revised proposal was in-
troduced in the Senate by Senator Hov/ard H, Baker of Tennessee
and in the House by Representative Jackson E, Betts of Ohio as
U,S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Opera-
tions , Intergovernmental Revenue Act of 1969 and Related
Legislation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations,
Senate, on S. 2483 and S. 2048, 91st Cong,, 1st sess,, 1969,
p. 1.
2
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc
,
, Revenue Sharing
Bulletin , November 1972, Vol, 1, No, 1, Washington, D.C., p, 7.
"Revenue Sharing," Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report ,
June 4, 1971, Vol, XXIX, No, 23, p. 1214.
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S 680 and HR 4l87, respectively. Mr. Humphrey, also a Demo-
cratic presidential prospect, v/asted no time in placing himself
in the forefront of the revenue sharing movement.
At this point, therefore, there were three versions of
revenue sharing being pursued by three powerful leaders: the
President's revised proposal; Senator Muskie's proposal, based
largely on the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations; and Senator Humphrey's proposal.
The major points in common as v;ell as the significant differences
of these three proposals will next be considered.
President Nixon's Revised Proposal
Mr. Nixon's new proposal reflected the renewed agreement
with state and local leaders nurtured by Mr. Wiedenbaum. Addi-
tionally, it represented a quantum jump in the President's commit-
ment to assist state and local governments. The amount of money
for the first year of the program was increased tenfold, from an
2
original $500 million to $5 billion. The concept of sharing
only surplus revenues was abandoned. Mr. Nixon offered his plan
after announcing that he would submit a deficit budget for Fiscal
3
Year 1972. Revenue sharing was treated as any other government
1
,1
"Revenue Sharing: Congress Moves Away From Nixon,"
Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report
,
March 12, 1971, Vol.
XXIX, No. 11, p. 632.
2
"Text of President's Message on Revenue Sharing," Con-
gressional Quarterly, V/eeklv Report, February 12, 1971, Vol.
XXIX, No. 7, p. 39 3.
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expense, although the idea was to make room for it by cutting or
eliminating other less urgent proposals.
The new proposal contained a bifurcated concept of general
revenue sharing and special revenue sharing. General revenue
sharing embodied the distribution of funds ($5 billion per year)
to lov/er level governments relatively free of restrictions
.
Special revenue sharing involved combining existing Federal aid
programs of $10 billion with $1 billion in new funds and using
these funds in six broad areas: law enforcement, manpower train-
ing, urban community development, rural community development,
transportation, and education. A major goal of the special
revenue sharing proposal was to consolidate many of the grant-in-
aid programs into a few categories designed to achieve specific
national objectives, rather than continue the widely dispersed
2
system of programs being financed by Federal grants-in-aid.
To complement the special revenue sharing proposal, various bills
to incorporate the objectives of the six broad areas mentioned
above were introduced.
Special revenue sharing is mentioned here because it was
an important corollary to the general revenue sharing proposal
^
submitted in Mr. Nixon's new plan. However, the President's
plans for special revenue sharing were never implemented nor
enacted into law, so this paper deals only with general revenue







Nixon attempted to overhaul the grant-in-aid program by using
general revenue sharing as a vehicle for reorganization. This
attempt did not survive the legislative process.
The key provisions of President Nixon's revised general
1
revenue sharing plan v/ere as follows :
(1) The size of the appropriation each year would be
a designated percentage of the nation's taxable personal
income, the base, on v;hich individual Federal income taxes
are levied. The fund vjould therefore grow in a steady
and predictable manner with the growing tax base, enabling
state and local governments to plan for the future.
(2) The specific appropriation level recommended was 1.3
percent of taxable personal income. At this level approx-
imately $5 billion would be distributed -during the first
full year of revenue sharing. It was anticipated that
this sum would rise to about $10 billion by I980.
(3) There would be a permanent appropriation on a per-
centage basis, thus placing the bill under the juris-
diction of the House Ways and Means Committee and by-
passing the annual appropriation procedures.
(4) A greater proportion (roughly half) of the shared
funds would go to local governments under the revised plan
(5) Two factors would be used to determine how much
money should go to each state: the size of the popula-
tion and the degree to which it has already utilized its
own tax resources.
(6) Tv70 options were available for determining the dis-
tribution of funds within a state: use of a formula to
be prescribed by the Federal government or use of a form-
ula that the states would negotiate v;ith their local gov-
ernm.ents . A bonus of 10 percent v;ould be paid to those
states developing their own distribution formula accept-
able to the Federal government. All funds going to local
governments would be channeled through the state gov-
ernment
.
(7) Governmental units of all sizes would be eligible
for aid
.
"Text of President's Message on Revenue Sharing,"
Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report , February 12, 1971,
Vol. XXIX No. 7, p. 393.
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(8) General revenue sharing funds would be distributed
with no program or project restrictions, at either the
state or local level.
Senator Muskie's Proposal
Senator Muskie's bill (S 1770), introduced for the second
time in early 1971, proposed sharing $6 billion in Federal
revenues the first year, $1 billion more than the Nixon plan.




(1) Apportionment of funds among local governments on
the basis of need, as well as population and tax effort,
which were common to both bills.
(2) A bonus, equal to 10 percent of a state's income
tax collections, to encourage the adoption of state
income taxes.
(3) Provisions for stronger safeguards against dis-
. crimination in the use of revenue sharing funds. A
mechanism for individual or class action suits was in-
cluded.
(4) Authorization of five-year appropriations, a means
of financing the program which would keep jurisdiction
over it in the Government Operations and Appropriations
Committees. The House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee had jurisdiction over the Nixon
plan because it involved automatic sharing of a propor-
tion of Federal revenues.
The most significant differences between the Nixon plan
and the Muskie plan v/ere, therefore, that Muskie's contained
the incentive for state income taxes, provided for specific
dollar appropriations over a limited period of time, and inter-
jected need as one of the criteria for distribution of funds.
"Revenue Sharing," Congressional Quarterly, Weekly
Report
,





Senator Hunphrey*s bill (S 2^1) closely paralled that
of Senator Muskie, providing $3 billion in the first year and
$5 billion each year thereafter, with appropriations to be made
annually. His bill also contained the state income tax incentive,
but in addition contained an incentive for the modernization of
state and local governments as a condition of participation by
the state governments. This was an explicit recognition of the
inefficient structure of many local governments. Since state
government possess the power to regulate city and county bound-
aries and the incorporation of these units of government. Senator
Humphrey sought to force the state government to correct organi-
zational inefficiencies of the local governments within the states,
A tabular comparison of the revised Nixon plan, the Muskie
and Humphrey proposals, and the Mills plan, which came several
months later, is contained in Appendix I.
Support for Revenue Sharing Legislation
As noted previously, support for some type of revenue
sharing had come from prominent politicians of both parties
at various times over the last decade. Both the Republican and
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Opera-
tions . Intergovernmental Revenue Act of 1971 and Related
Legislation . Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations of the Committee on Government Opera-





Democratic presidential nominees endorsed the concept in the
1968 election, and in the 1969-1971 period, the President and
Senators Muskie and Humphrey had introduced bills to institute
such a program.
Interest in the program was sustained by the intense lob-
bying efforts of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the
National League of Cities. By early 1971 many members of
Congress had become convinced that they should join the revenue
sharing bandv/agon. They expected to gain politically from the
distribution of Federal funds in their states and districts.
Realizing that the regular and continuous dispensing of funds-
achieves the maximum political effect, most members of Congress
became mesmerized by this feature of revenue sharing.
Opposition to Revenue Sharing
While many Senators and Congressmen had joined the grow-
ing movement in favor of revenue sharing during 1970 and the
first half of 1971, one crucial holdout remained: Chairman
Wilbur D. Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee. Mr. Mills
was more than a holdout—he was the foremost critic of revenue
sharing. In an address to the Louisiana legislature on June 1,
I97I5 Mr. Mills said he was planning a quiet funeral for the
Nixon revenue-sharing bill as soon as his committee completed
hearings on it.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
Bulletin
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Chairman Mills was joined in his opposition to revenue
sharing by the ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee,
Mr. John W. Byrnes. At a news conference on June 2, Mr. Mills
predicted, as he had several times previously, that the committee
would not approve the bill. Mr. Mills was opposed not only to
the Administration's bill, but to any form of revenue sharing.
"I am not convinced," he said, "that the states are in worse
condition than we are here in Washington."
Chairman Mills specific objections to the Administration's
general revenue sharing program ivere:
(1) The Administration's general revenue sharing plan
would distribute funds to all local governments on the
basis of their tax collection and not on the basis of
need.
(2) Without "strings attached," revenue sharing would
completely divorce the responsibility for raising revenue
. from the spending of revenue.
(3) Revenue sharing would add another "uncontrollable"
expenditure to the Federal Budget.
(^) Revenue sharing would do nothing to encourage state
and local governments, which were in financial diffi-
culty, to help themselves.
In August, 1971, representatives of the National League
of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors met with Chairman
Mills to discuss his opposition to the Administration's bill and
possible alternatives. Mr. Mills apparently became convinced of
the political volatility surrounding the drive for revenue





stand and committed himself to work for some type of program.
Chairman Mills' subsequent actions brings to mind a bit
of philosophy once expounded by the late Senator Everett Dirksen.
Senator Dirksen once observed that if it looks like you're about
to get run out of tov/n on a rail, then get out in front and make
it look like you're leading a parade. That is precisely what
Mr. Mills did. Once he had changed his mind, he was determined
that the final product v/ould be his bill.
Mr. Mills had actually begun to reconsider his stand
against revenue sharing before the August meeting with the
National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. On
June 9 J only one v/eek after his avowed plans to bury the bill.
Chairman Mills held a closed meeting of Democratic Congressional
and party leaders in which he discussed an alternative plan to
the Administration's proposal. He described this as preliminary
2
thinking v;hich was subject to negotiation V7ith committee members.
Following this meeting and the negotiations in August
with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of
Cities, Mr. Mills instructed his staff to work vjith these tv/o
organizations, as well as wit;h representatives of the governors,
3legislators and the counties to develop a compromise bill.
Revenue Sharing Advisory Service, Inc., Revenue Sharing
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,
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Upon completion of the work conducted Jointly by Mr.
MIII3' staff and the various representatives of lov;er echelon
governments. Congressman Mills Introduced the Intercovernmcntal
Fiscal Coordination Act of 1971 (HR 11950) on November 30, 1971.'^
The final bill that emerged from the Committee bore a different
title, inasmuch as it v/as rewritten in committee to some extent,
but the provisions of the bill were nearly identical in concept
to the original Mills bill (HR 11950).
Congressman Wilbur D. Mills* Proposal
After deciding that he would support a revenue sharing
bill. Chairman Mills announced that he favored a plan that would
give more benefits to urban areas and less to state governmenT^s
.
Mr. Mills concluded tnat localities were facing the most severe
financial conditions and that there were very few taxation measures
available to them to solve their own problems. On the other hand,
he concluded that many state governments v;ere not making effec-
tive use of their revenue sources, either by not employing certain
taxes, such as individual and corporate income taxes and general
sales taxes, or by keeping rates too lov;. His bill therefore
would distribute the funds on the basis of need to state and local
governments. In keeping with this goal, the bill provided that
tv;o-thlrds of all revenue sharing funds v;ould go to local gov-
2






Nixon's revised bill, about 48 percent v/ould have gone to local
governments, and under his original proposal, even less was
slated for local governments.
The bill contained a complex distribution system that
encouraged both total tax effort and state Income taxes. It
specifically encouraged the adoption of state income taxes in
much the same manner as the Muskie and Humphrey plans had sug-
^ 2gested.
Rather than be an "open ended" program as was the Nixon
proposal, Mr. Mills program would be of limited duration, a five
year period of time. Additionally, rather than embracing an
"uncontrollable" appropriation in the Federal budget of a fixed
percsntage of Federal revenues, as the Nixon plan had proposed,
the Mills plan allocated a fixed dollar amount for each of the
five years, with $3.5 billion to local governments and $1.8 billion
to state governments during the first yaar. This amount would be
increased by $150 million for the second year and $300 million
3
for each succeeding year for the rest of the five-year period.
This provision concerning a fixed amount of money each
year is particularly interesting in that the only reason the Ways
and Means Committee had Jurisdiction over the legislation x^/as
that the Nixon bill had provided for a percentage of revenues
rather than a fixed dollar amount. V/ith the Mills proposal now






the revenue sharing legislation should have been treated as any
other appropriations measure. This would mean that the Ways and
Means Cominittee v/ould no longer have Jurisdiction over the bill
and that the House Appropriations Committee would assume that
authority. Mr. Mills was determined, however, that any revenue
sharing legislation reported to the House floor would not only
bear his stamp, but would also be closed to amendment from the
floor. As will be discussed in greater detail later, this pre-
cipitated a struggle between the Ways and Means Committee, Appro-
priations Committee, and House Rules Committee.
The Mills bill also set both a floor and a ceiling for
amounts to be received by local governments. Any locality whose
allocation amounted to less than $200 v;ould receive nothing at
all, a limitation imposed tc discourage the inccrporation of
small hamlets for the purpose of sharing in the Federal bounty.
It placed a ceiling on the total allocation to any locality of
50 percent of the unit's taxes and transferred funds.
The Mills bill also attached more "strings" to the funds
shared with local governments than did the Administration's pro-
2
posal. Many members of Congress, and particularly Mr. Mills,
regard supervision of the use of Federal funds as their peroga-
tive and responsibility. They take the position that it is their
duty to establish the conditions under v;hich any grant of Federal
money is to be spent. Therefore, the Ways and Means Committee
was not in agreement v;ith the granting of carte blanche to state
^Ibid., p. 1002. ^Ibid., p. 1002.
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and local governments for the expenditure of revenue sharing
funds
,
Expenditures under the Mills program v;ould be limited to
financing local Items designated as national high priority needs
by the Federal government
, I.e., the Ways and Means Committee.
These priority Items Included public safety, environmental pro-
tection, public transportation, youth recreation programs, health
administration, and related capital programs.
The major differences In philosophy between the Pres-
ident's revised plan and Mr. Mills' proposal have been explored,
but the details of the latter will not be discussed here. Chapter
V will discuss the details of the final bill adopted by the Con-
gress, and as previously indlv^ated, except for minor adjustments
the final legislation was identical to the bill introduced by
Mr. Mills, Final action by the V/ays and Means Committee v;as cojn-
pleted on April 17, 1972, v;hen the committee voted l8-7 to report
2
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (HR 1^370).
The designation of the bill had been changed during committee
processing to reflect a broader base of participation by committee
members, even though no important changes had been made to the
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Clash Betv/e'^n the Ways and Means and House
Appropriations Committees
Havlnc overseen the adoption of his own proposal by the
House Ways and Means Committee, Chairman Mills was determined
that this version of revenue sharing legislation would prevail.
There v;ere, however, nearly as many revenue sharing proposals
floating around Capitol Hill as there were constituencies repre-
sented. Each Senator and Congressman was in favor of a distri-
bution formula that would favor his own particular state or dis-
trict. For example. Senator Baker of Tennessee, who had intro-
duced the revised Nixon plan in the Senate as S 680, and Senator
Gurney of Florida, both represent states having a constitutional
prohibition against a state income tax and v;ere cpposcci' to any
distribution formula that would penalize their states for ne'e
having this type of tax. The Congressmen from these states
would naturally attempt to amend the bill from the floor to lessen
the incentive for state Income taxes. There were many other
special interests that members of Congress could be expected to
protect by amendment from the floor.
Chairman Mills, therefore, deemed it essential that the
committee bill be reported to the House floor as a closed bill,
meaning that only amendments from the V/ays and Means Committee
would be in order when the bill came before the House. This
1
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Opera-
tions. Intern:overnmental Revenue Act of 1971 and Related
Legislation . Hearings before the Subconmiittee on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Com.mittee on Government Operations,




would also waive points of order against the bill. Bills from
the V/ays and Means Committee, usually tax bills, are often granted
closed rules because of their complexity.
Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon vigorously
2
objected to the reporting of a closed bill in this instance.
The Ways and Means Committee had originally exercised jurisdiction
over the revenue sharing program because the bill introduced on
behalf of the Nixon Administration featured the distribution of
a percentage of Federal revenues. The program as revised by
Mills, however, deleted that feature and instead allowed for the
appropriation of a fixed sum of money in each of five years.
Here, then, was a bill that had evolved into nothing less than a
pure appropriations measure that not only bypassed Kalicn's com-
mittee, but would be reported before the House as a closed bill
3that Mahon could not alter.
Mahon was supported by Chairman V/llliam M. Colmer of the
1]
Rules Committee which has the authority to rule on such matters.
A third faction was led by Congressman Henry S. Reuss who had co-
sponsored the Humphrey revenue sharing plan the previous year.
Reuss sought to use the revenue sharing bill as a vehicle for
tax reform, and to do this it was necessary for the bill to be
open to amendment on the House floor. Mills, however, v;ith the
support of Speaker Carl Albert, won the closed rule by an 8-7 vote
"Revenue-Sharing Bill Delayed," Conrressional Quarterly ,
Weekly Report, May 27, 197 2, Vol. XXX, No. 22, p. 122^.
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid. Ibid.

of the Rules Committee on May 23, 1972.
Chairman Mahon was livid. On June 7, he voiced his obj-
2
ectlons as follov/s:
Next v/eek there Is also scheduled to be before the House
a $30 billion appropriation bill out of the Ways and
Means Committee.
Mr. Speaker, this V/ays and Means Committee bill does not
raise one penny of revenue. It Is an authorization bill
and It Is an appropriation bill for five years. It bypasses
the established authorization process involving a number
of major legislative committees, and it bypasses the es-
tablished appropriations process which we have known for
the last 52 years.
Not in the history of Congress that I can find has an ap-
propriation bill come to the floor under a closed rule
which is now proposed for this Ways and Means Committee bill.
I say it is indefensible that the appropriation bill of
$30 billion should come before the House next week under a
closed rule. Members should have the right to make points
of order and offer amendments. I propose to do v;hat I
can to open up the rule so the House can v:ork its ;;ill on
that appropriation bill. Just as it does on other approp-
riation bills
.
Mr. r^ahon never had the opportunity to influence the bill, be-
cause the House supported the closed rule by a vote of 223-185
3
on June 21. This action virtually assured passage of the bill.
The closed rule limited action on the House floor to the alter-
natives of passing the bill, killing it, or returning it to the
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and local officials and their organizations lobbying vigorously
for the bill v/ith strong support from taxpayers, anything but
passage of the bill was unthinkable. The bill commanded an im-
pressive majority of 27^-122 on a roll-call vote on June 22.
Debate had been limited to eight hours by the closed rule. The
Mills bill now went to the Senate.
Senate Hearings on the House Approved Bill
The Senate Finance Committee started hearings on the
2
revenue sharing bill on June 29. The Administration took this
opportunity to try to reverse some of the changes that the Ways
and Means Committee had made to President Nixon's plan. Speaking
for ^he Administration, Treasury Secretary George P. Shult^; en-
dorsed the bill, specifically acquiescing ro rhe fixed dollar
allocation over a period of five years, but asked for the follov/ing
changes
:
(1) Removal of the state income tax Incentive from the
bill and restoration of Mr. Nixon's plan vihich rewards
overall state and local tax effort, regardless of source.
(2) Removal of the House-imposed series of high-priority
categories and restoration of the President's proposal
requiring only that the funds be used for legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes and in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
C3 ) Dilution of the urbanized population factor to dls-
tritute the funds among the states. This factor discriminated
Ibid .
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance, Revenue
Sharing . Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate,




against states without urban populations, such as
Alaska, Vermont, and Montana.
Senator Baker of Tennessee also testified against the
income tax incentive, pointing out that Tennessee has a con-
stitutional prohibition against such a tax. He introduced an
amendment to reflect the Administration's stand on this particular
point
.
The Senate Finance Committee v;as most receptive to the
suggestions of Secretary Schultz and Senator Baker. Due to the
nature of Senate constituencies, there were many Senators who
opposed giving the urbanized states more money and wanted to
2
eliminate the state income tax incentive.
The Senate Finance Committee reported an amended version
of HR 1^370 to the Senate floor on August 9.^ This bill reduced
the amount of funds to be granted to urbanized states and in-
creased funds for less populous states, but at the same time
maintained funds for the major cities. This sounds somewhat
contradictory, but is consistent if one distinguishes betvreen
urbanized areas, v;hich includes suburbs, and the cities themselves
In addition to deleting the urbanization factor from the
allocation formula developed by the House, the Senate Finance
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two changes, if enacted, would reduce the amount to be received
by heavily urbanized states in which income taxes provide a
major share of state revenues (such as New York and California)
to about half the amount that v;ould be received under the House
1
bill.
The Committee accepted the amount of money and the five
year period of time established by the House bill, but dis-
mantled the complicated formulas the House bill provided for the
2distribution of funds. The House had established a "five-factor
formula," which will be explained in detail in Chapter V, for
distributing revenue sharing funds. The Finance Committee de-
cided to distribute funds according to three factors : population,
3tota^ tax effort, and inverse per capita inccne. This reflected
the decision to eliminate the urbanization factor and the income
tax incentive and supported Mr. Mills' contention that allocation
should also be based on need. In summary, the changes generally
were to the advantage of the less-urbanized and less-wealthy states
Most members of the Senate Finance Committee, like Chairman
Russell Long of Louisiana, represent states in this category.
Under the distribution formula proposed by the Committee,
33 states v;ould receive more than under the House bill, and 17
states dIus the District of Columbia would receive less. Of the
H.R. 1^370, 92nd Conr^., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, Report Toi;;ether v;ith Additional and





16 states represented on the Committee, 13 would receive more
1
under this version.
The Finance Committee decided to use the same formula
for distribution of funds to local governments within the states.^
In this manner major cities were provided for generously while
the amount for suburbs was reduced.
The Committee also eliminated the restrictions on use
3
of funds that the House bill had imposed. This would have al-
lowed funds to be used for education and welfare, activites pro-
hibited by the House restrictions.
At the urging of Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana, the
Committee also agreed to make Indian tribes eligible to share
Hin the funds allocated to local governments. This did not re-
present much of a change from a strictly monetary viewpoint, but
it is indicative of the many social and political considerations
of a bill of this nature.
Many other suggestions made to the Committee during the
5hearings were of course rejected. For example:
"Revenue Sharing," Congressional Quarterly, Weekly
Report
,
August 12, 1972, Vol. XXX, No. 33, p. 2016.
^H.R. 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, Report Together v;lth Additional and
Minority Views (to Accompany H.R. 1^370) , pp. 1^-15.
3Ibid
. , p . l6.
Ibid., p. 23.
^"Senate Rejects Major Changes in Revenue-Sharing Bill,"
Congressional Quarterly, V/eekly Report , September 9, 1972,
Vol~ XXX, Ho. 33, p. 2316.

^9
(1) Mr. Roland M. Blxler, president of J.B.T. Inntruments
of I.'ew Haven, Connecticut, speaking for the National
Association of Manufacturers, ur^cd the Incorporation of
an amendment that would cive businesses some type of
relief from the differing state and local taxes.
(2) Mr. Paul Parks, administrator of the model cities
program in Boston, speaking for Americans for Democratic
Action, supported revenue sharing for local governments
but v/anted to eliminate disti*lbution of funds to the
state governments.
(3) Senator James L. Buckley of New York proposed that
revenue sharing per se not be adopted, suggesting an
alternative plan under which the Federal government
would shift part of its personal Income tax base to
the states and share its tax-collecting facilities
to help the states collect their own income taxes.
Many Interest groups opposed the bill entirely. In a
moment of rare agreement both business and labor interests
testified against adoption of any kind of revenue sharing legis-
lation. Mr. Bixler, who had urged the adoption of the tax re-
lief amendment for businesses, actually opposed the bill com-
pletely, but realizing it would probably pass, was attempting
to make It as palatable as possible. Mr. Eugene F. Rinta,
Executive Director of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce,
opposed the bill on principle, and Mr. Andrew J. Biemiller,
Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO, opposed it on
grounds of impracticability as well as on principle.
Clash Betv/een the Senate Finance Cor:r7iittee and
the Senate ADDroDriations Comnittee
After approval of the revenue sharing bill by the Senate
H.R. 1^4370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess . (1972); Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, Report Torother v;ith Additional and
Minority "'lews (to Accompany H.K. 1^370), pp. 3^37, ^50, ^07.
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Finance Committee, a struggle took place between the Finance
Committee and the Approprlatlonc Committee, similar to that
1
between Mills and Mahon In the House. The Senate struggle was
much less Intense, however, and was resolved without the show-
down over rules that had characterized the situation in the
House,
On August 10, the day after the Finance Committee ordered
the bill reported, the Appropriations Committee, under the new
leadership of Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas, voted to
demand an opportunity to consider the bill before it v;ent to the
2
floor. McClellan' s demand was based on the same feature of the
bill that Mahon had cited, i.e., that dollar amounts specified
in the bill constituted an appropriations measure over which his
committee should have jurisdiction.
To counter this move. Senator Long's committee on August
11 voted to rescind its previous action and not report the bill
3
to the floor. Senator Long iras determined, as Congressman Hills
had been, that the bill should not be subject to annual or
periodic appropriations which would expose revenue sharing to
pressures both from recipients and from conflicting claims
«
of other Federal programs.
Noting that other trust-funded programs, such as Social
Security, were financed under permanent appropriations and did
^"Senate Rejects Major Changes in Revenue-Sharing Bill,"
Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report , September 9, 1972,
Vol. XXX, IJo. 37, p. 2316.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.

1not require annual appropriation action by tlio ConcrecG, the
Finance Corjnitteo circurrivented Senator McClellan's corrunlttee
by sinply redrafting; one provlr.ion of the bill. It removed
the dollar appropriations and provided a "permanent" appropria-
tlon of 7 percent of personal income tax receipts of a CDcclal
revenue-sharing trust fund for the five-year life of the program.
This action in essence reinstated the method of funding that had
originally been proposed by the President, but placed it in
direct opposition to the desires of Chairman Mills.
Confident that the amended bill had sufficient support
to reject; any effort by the Appropriations Committee to take
control of it on the floor, the Finance Committee reported the
bill to rhe Senate floor for the second time on August 16. Un-
like the situation in the House in v;hich the bill v;ent to the
floor under closed procedures, the Senate bill was open to
2
amendment; from the floor.
Some minor amendments v;ere adopted from the floor. One
offered ty Senator Vance Kartke of Indiana applied Federal
labor standards to projects and government positions financed
3
with revenue sharing funds. Another amendment by Senator Long
Li
was adopted to dilute somev.-hat the Hartke amendment. Long's
amendment: restricted the wage requirements of the Hartke amendment
-^Ibid.
"^"Senate Revenue-Siiaring Bill Favors Small, Rural States,"
Congressional Cuarterly, V."t-^ekly Report , September 16, 1972,




to projects or positions for which more than 25 percent of the
funding came from revenue sharing money. Senator Hubert Humphrey,
the perennial labor devotee, attempted to counter Long's 25 per-
cent restriction with an amendment of his own that would have
exempted the construction of sewage and refuse disposal systems
and transportation systems from the 25 percent limit. This
2
attempt was unsuccessful, being defeated by a vote of 46-39.
Another amendment by Humphrey was adopted, a noncontro-
versial proposal directing the Joint Committee on Internal Rev-
enue Taxation to prepare a report by June 30, 1973, on real
3
estate and property tax administration.
Several amendments were also rejected, the most important
one being an attem.pt by Senator McClellan, once again, to gain
control of the appropriations aspect of the bill. By a.'
34_i|9 vote the Senate rejected McClellan' s bid to require the
Appropriations Committee's approval of revenue sharing funds for
the last three years (fiscal 197^-1976) covered under the bill.
An amendment by Senator Ribicoff altering the committee formula
for allocation of funds to the states was defeated 2^-61.
Senator Ribicoff wanted to reinstate the formula that would favor
urbanized populations, the same formula passed by the House but
changed by the Senate Finance Committee. The rural states clearly
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid. Ibid. ^Ibid.
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prevailed over the urban states In the Senate. Predictably, the
24 Senators voting for the Riblcoff amendment were from states
whose shares v/ould have been enlarged by his formula.
Two amendments offered by Senator Hartke v;ere also de-
feated. One would have prohibited the use of revenue sharing
funds to Induce a business or Industry to move a factory or other
facility from one area to another. The second would have applied
the labor requirements of the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act
to any urban mass transportation systems acquired by governmental
units with Federal revenue sharing funds. Southern Senators
were instrumental- in the defeat of both of these amendments.
On September 12, 1972, the Senate passed the revenue
2
sharing bill by a 64-20 vote. The final bill was substantially
the same as reported by the Finance Committee, a bill favoring
the small, rural states, and one imposing minimal controls on
the usage of funds.
Final Compromises in the Conference Committee
The major provision of the bill to be settled by the
House and Senate conferees was the matter of distribution formulas
The House version of the bill, based on five factors, had provided
larger amounts to the more populous, urban states and had con-
tained an incentive for states to employee an income tax. The
Senate version, based on three factors, favored the less populous,




Since neither side was wlllinc to abandon completely the
formula developed by its legislative branch, an unusual com-
promise v/as adopted that allov;ed each state the larger of the
two amounts available under the different formulas approved by
the House and Senate. With each state given the higher of two
possible shares, total funding would obviously exceed the amount
appropriated for each of the five years. Therefore, to offset
this increase, the conference agreement provided for a propor-
tional reduction of each state'a allocation to keep the total
within the established limits for each year.
While allowing a choice between two methods of deter-
mining how much Federal revenue would go to all governments within
a state, the conferees adopted the Senate's version for deter-
mining how the state total would be distributed among the state
2
government and the various local governments within the state.
Another matter to be settled was the differences over
usage of funds by state and local governments, with the House
version favoring fairly strict limitations on usage by both state
and local governments, and the Senate version favoring practically
no restrictions on either. The conference committee agreed to a
provision that would place restrictions on local governments but
not on state governments.
""H.R. 1^370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee of
Conference, U.S. Senate - House of Representatives, Conference






Reflecting the ar.endment that had been offei-ed by Sen-
ator Lee Metcali' dui'lng debate of the bill on the Sc'nate floor,
the conference acr'eenient included a provision allocatlnp^ part
of a county area'n allotrnt-nt to the covernin;^ bodien of local
Indian tribe;; or Alaskan native villaces that performed sub-
stantial covernrr.ental functions. The Senate floor amendment had
set aside 0.25 percent of total revenue sharlnc funds for Indian
tribes and Alaskan natives, but the conference acreenent provided
an allocation on the basis of population as a percentage of the
county population.
The conference agreement also approved specific dollar
appropriations rather than the percentages adopted by the Senate
2before reporting the bill to the Senate floor the second tim.'=^.
This had been a ploy to keep control of the bill within the
Senate Tinance Committee and out of the hands of Senator McClellan's
com^nittee. Once the bill had passed the Senate and gone to the
conference committee, there v;as no need to retain the percentage
feature In the legislation.
The House and Senate conferees filed a conference report
on Septer.i. er 25, signifying final agreem.ent on the revenue sharing
bill. Congress accepted the conference version on October 13 by
3
1 vote of 59-19 in the Senate and 265-110 in the House.
^' Ibid ., Sec. 108.
"Ibid., Sec. 105.
-^"Congress Clears lilxon's Fiovenue-Shnring Plan,"
Congressional Quarterly, V.'eekly Report , October 7, 19'/'2,
Vol. XXZ, IJo . m1, p. 2u30.
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To dramatize what he called the "New American Revolution,"
President Nixon sicned the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972 into lav/ at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on
October 20, 1972, statinc, "It is appropriate that we launch
this New American Revolution in the same place where the first
American Revolution was launched by our founding; fathers I96
years ago,"




PROVISIONS OF THE STATE AMD LOCAL
FISCAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1972
This chapter focuses on the major aspects of the Revenue
Sharing Act, and though an occasional analysis in interjected
in this part of the paper, critical comments are confined pri-
marily to Chapter VII.
In general terms, the act distributes money on the basis
of census data and other objective statistics and provides for
a distribution of funds over a five year period of time. The
money v;ill be automatically available for each of Lhese five
years, so state and local governments can count on the revenue
in their ovm fiscal planning. One-third of the revenue going to
a state will be received by the state government and two-thirds
1
by the local governments v;ithin the state.
Appropriations
The Revenue Sharing Act creates a trust fund knov/n as
the "State and Local Government Fiscal Assistance Trust Fund"
and provides for the appropriation to this Trust Fund from the
general fund of the U.S. Treasury a total of $30.2 billion over
'''State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1072
,




a period of five years. Thece funds are automatically released
to the Treasury for distribution, and will not be subject to
the annual appropriation procedures.
The appropriations, covering a period of time from
January 1, 1972 through December 31, 1976, are as follows:
January 1, 197? through June 30, 1972 $2.7 billion
Fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972 5.6 billion
Fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973 6.0 billion
Fiscal year beginning July 1, 197^ 6.2 billion
Fiscal year beginning July 1, 1975 6.4 billion
July 1, 1976, through December 31, 1976 3.3 billion
Assurances to the Secretary of the Treasury
In order to qualify for Revenue Sharing funds allocated
for the period January through June, 1973, and thereafter, local
governments must submit assurances to the Secretary of the
Treasury that certain terms and conditions of the law will be met
The law requires that the assurances also be submitted to the
Governor of each state for review and comment. Each unit of
local government must establish to the satisfaction of the Sec-
3
retary that it will:
(1) Establish a trust fund in which all payments of
funds, and interest earned thereon, v;ill be de-
posited.
(2) Use these amounts during the period of time es-
tablished by the Secretary.
-"- Ibid ., Sec. 105.
2State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 , Sec
.
105, 86 Stat. 919 (1972).
^Ibld., Sees. 121, 122, 123.
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(3) Expend these funds only for uses permitted by
the Act,
(^) Make expenditures from these funds only In accord-
ance v;lth laws and procedures applicable to Its
own funds.
(5) Use fiscal, accounting, and audit procedures con-
forming to guidelines established by the Secretary.
(6) Provide the Secretary and the Comptroller General
of the U.S. v/ith access to books, documents, papers,
or records for purposes of reviewing compliance.
(7) Make all annual or interim reports required by the
Secretary
.
(8) Pay wages to employees out of general revenue
sharing funds at the same rates it pays other
employees in similar occupations.
(9) Assure that laborers and mechanics employed by con-
tractors on a project funded in part v/ith revenue
sharing funds are paid according to the provisions
of the Davis-Bacon Act.
The requirements listed above were established to enable
the Secretary of the Treasury to make periodic compliance
studies and to assist Congress in determining whether the revenue
sharing program should be continued, revised, or terminated at
the end of the initial five-year period. The Secretary of the
Treasury v/lll report to the Congress not later than March 1 of
each year on the operation and status of revenue sharing alloca-
tions during the previous year.
Reports to the Secretary of the Treasury
Each unit of local government v/hlch expects to receive




settinc forth the amounts and purposes for which It plans to
use the funds. This report is to be submitted before the be-
ginning of each entitlement period and nmst be submitted in the
form and detail prescribed by the Secretary. Then after the close
of each entitlement period, a report on hovi the funds were act-
ually used must be submitted. Additionally, the reports must be
made available to the public by publishment in a newspaper v;hich
has general circulation within the area.
Restrictions on the Use of Revenue Sharing Funds
Only minimal restrictions have been applied to the use of
revenue sharing funds. Two general restrictions apply to both
state and local governments: Funds cannot be used for matching
funds for Federal grant-in-aid programs, nor may they be used
for projects or programs which discriminate on the basis of race,
2
color, sex or national origin. These restrictions are the only
ones imposed on the state governments. Local governments have
the additional prohibition that revenue sharing funds may not be
used for educational purposes other than libraries. Additionally,
local governments must use their funds only for "priority ex-
penditures," v;hich under the provisions of the act are defined
3as : -•











a) public safety (including law enforcement, fire
protection, and bulldinc code enforcement)
b) environmental protection (including r>ev;ap;e dis-
posal, sanitation, and pollution abatement)
c) public transportation (including transit systems




g) social services for the poor or aged
h) financial administration
2, Ordinary and necessary capital expenditures author-
ized by law.
Although local governments are required to use their
money for these categories o^ expenditures specified by the act,
the categories are of such a general nature triat a great deal
of • latitude exists in the expenditure of revenue sharing funds.
Maintenance of Support by State Governments
To ensure that state governments do not use revenue
sharing as an excuse to curtail support to local governments,
the bill requires that each state must provide as much support
to the local governments as it did during Fiscal Year 1972.
Beginning July 1, 1973, any state government which reduces its
aid below the level of aid provided in Fiscal Year 1972 will have
its revenue sharing allocation reduced accordingly. This main-





takes over certain functions which were previously the respon-
sibility of local governments, or if it gives or transfers to
local governments nev; taxing authorities.
Federal ("Piggyback") Collection of
State Income Taxes
Provision is made in the Revenue Sharing Act for Federal
collection of state income taxes at the request of state govern-
ments. If a state exercises this option, the Federal Government
is to handle the administration of the state income tax. Under
this provision, the Federal Government would collect the states'
share in the withholding of Income taxes from wages and salaries.
Employers withholding state income taxes would pay them to the
U.S. Treasury instead of to state treasuries, v;ith the v;ithheld
funds being paid promptly to the states by the Federal Government.
To take advantage of Federal collection of state income
taxes, the state generally is to conform its income tax to the
Federal tax. The state may either express its tax as a percentage
of Federal income tax or apply the state income tax rates to the
same base as Federal taxable income. In both cases, hov;ever,
adjustments are to be made for state and municipal bond interest*
income, state income tax payments deducted for Federal income
2
tax purposes, and Federal bond interest income.
This provision is to go into effect on January 1, 197^,
if at least five states accounting for at least five percent of
^Ibld. , Sec. 202. ^Ibid.
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th^ taxpayfTG in the- U.S. have requected Federal collection of
their i:tate incorr.e taxec
.
Several purpocer> of thin provision are noted. One pur-
pose is to ach.ieve a decree of 3tandardii:ation of state and Fed-
eral Iricone tax lav;s for those states optlnc for this collection
service. Another is simply to provide a service to the states
through the efficient collection mechanism of the Internal Rev-
enue Service. A major purpose is to encourace the use and ex-
pansion of the state income tax as part of the stimulation of
state and local tax efforts discussed in Chapter II.
Distribution of Revenue Sharinr: Funds
Due to conflicting interests in the House and Senate
arate formulas v.'ere developed for determining an allocation for
a state. The House formiula favored the larger, industrialized
states, and tl--- Senate formula, predictably, benefited the
smaller, more rural states. Rather than accept a compromise
formula. Congress simply adopted both formulas, essentially al-
lov/ing each state to take either the House grant or the Senate
"rant, v/hichever would be the more generous. Then on the related
question of allocations v/ithin the states, the conferees chose
the Senate form.ula v;hich focuses funds on the cities and poor
rural areas
.
"Revenue Sharing: House-Senate Agreements Filed,"
Conr-ress 1 onal c:uai:'t-rly , W^^ei'lv Report, October 7, 1972,
vcT-r-?:xx i;o. ^i, p.

The tv/o formulas v.'lll be dincussed In some detail to
chov/ liov; the specific allocations are determined. Then the
hierarchical steps involved in the distribution will be illus-
trated by luoans of a cliart.
The Senate formula, knov/n as the "three-factor formula,"
distributes revenue by usin?- a "population fcictor," a "general
tax effort factor," and a "relative income" factor.
The "three-factor formula" for computing revenue sharing
is as follov.'s :
Each state's share =
($5.3 billion) X (oonulation) X (GTEF) X (RTF) of a state
Sum of products of (population) X (GTEF) X (RIF) of all states
vjhere
.'^5,3 billion is the total amount available in 1972; this
will vary somev/hat in subsequent years
GTEF = General Tax Effort Factor =
Met Taxes Collectr^d (state and local)
Aggregate Personal Income
RIF = Relative Incomxe Factor =
Per Capita Income of U.S.
Per Caolta Income of tiiat state
Tv/o Im.pcrtant observations are made at this point. The
first is that an increase in the GTEF v;ould increase the share
being received by a state, and that given a particular Aggregate
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1072
,
Sec. 106, b- Star. ^'10 (1972).
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Personal Income for that state, the only way to Increase the
GTEF is to INCREASE the level of state and local taxes. This
is not to infer that a state would necessarily raise taxes in
order to increase its proceeds from revenue sharing, but it does
suggest that a state would be reluctant to cut its taxes and
lose revenues through both the tax cut and the ensuing decrease
in revenue sharing funds.
The second observation is that a high RIF is also favor-
able for a state and that the lower the per capita income of a
state, the higher will be the RIP. Additionally, the lower the
incom-O of a state, the higher the GTEF, and- consequently the
higher the state's share. In summary, the "three-factor formula"
favors those states vjith high population, high local taxes, and
lovj income.
The far more complicated "five-factor formula" developed
by the House divides the total amount of revenue to be shared




3- Population Weighted Inversely for Per Capita Income
4. Income Tax Collections
5- General Tax Effort
-^Ibid., Sees. 106, 107, 108, 109.
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Each part Is determined as follows (Note: the flp;ures of $3.5
billion and $1.8 billion repreoont two-thirds and one-thiird,
respectively, of the total anourit available for 1972, and will
vary somev/hat in ivabseouont years):
First Part: Each State's Share =
1/3 X ($3.5 billion) X Population of State
PoDulation of All States
Second Part: Each State's Share =
1/3 X ($3.5 billion) X Urban PoDulation of State
Urban Population of All States
Third Parr: Each State's Share =
1/3 X ($3.5 billion) X Pooulation of Stare a Wari. Per CaD±La I:k;
^cnulation of All States State Per Caoita Inc
Sum of Pr-:''-;uc:^s of (State Pooulatlon) .. (liaoicr.al rer Capita Income)
(State Per Capita Income of All States)
Fourth Tc-.r'z: Each State's Share =
1/2 X ($1.8 billion) X State Income Tax
All Income Tax
Fifth Parx: Each State's Share =
1/2 X ($1.8 billion) X General Tax Effort Factor of Stat^
General Tax Effort Factor of
A. 11 States
where





The follov/lnr; observations concernlnr the "five-factor
formula" are nacie, conridorlnc each of the above parts separately
(a) Firnt Part - the liirher the population of the
state the ,f';reater v/111 be its share.
(b) Cecond Part - the hir.her the urban population
of the state the ^^reater will be its share.
(c) Third Part - the lower the state per capita income
the ci^<^S-tor will be its share; additionally, cheater
population v;ill increase this portion as well.
(d) Fourth Part - the greater the state income tax
the cheater will be its share.
(e) Fifth x^art - the greater the general tax effort
of the state the greater will be its share.
In summary, the "five-factor formula" favors those states
with high urban populations, high local taxes, states with in-
come oaxes, and states with low income. The First, Second, and
Third Parts each account for approximately 22 percent of the
total amount a state receives, the Fourth and Fifth Parts account-
ing for 17 percent each. Perhaps the most important point is
that the effect of high state taxes is given even more importance
under this plan than under the "three-factor formula."
The tv;o formulas discussed so far are used to determine
the amount of money going to the state as a 'whole, not to the
state govort:!ment itself. Once this amiount has been determ.ined,
one-third oT it goes to tlie state governm.ent and tv;o-thirds to
the lower-echelon gc^vernments v;ithin the states, i.e., county
city, township or other local units of government. Provision





Trie allocation of fund:-, to the local unitr. of government
is determined by UL:lnr a variation of the "tl^ree-factor formula."
2
The amount f^oinp; to a county area is determined as follows:
County Area's Share = 2/3 (State Share) X
County Population X (OTEF) X (RI^)
Sum of Products oT ( iopulatlon) X (GTEF ) X (RiF)
for All Counties
Interestingly enough, the share for Indians in the county has
first priority after the amount for the entire county area has
3been determined. This is calculated as follov/s:
Slmre for Indians in County = Toral County Area Share X
Indian Population
County Population
/.iter the Indians' shai'e has been deducted from the total
county area share, the share for the county government itself is
computed as follov;s:
County Government's Share = Remaining County Area Total X
Adjusted Taxes of County Government
Adjusi^ed Taxes of All Local Governmenr Units in
Couiity, Including County Government
It can be seen from the above formula that the County Government's
Share is based upon a proportional share of the county area
Ibid., Sec. lOB. ^Ibid. "^Ibid. Ibid . , Sec. Iv08.
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adjusted taxes. The shares for the townships and municipalities
within the county are computed in exactly the same v;ay , i.e., as
a proportional share of the county area adjusted taxes.
An examination of the formulas for computing the County
Area's Share and the County Government's Share reveals the same
emphasis on tax collection at the local level that v/as discussed
earlier in regard to the state allocations. That is, the higher
a county's taxes the higher will be its share. It is also ap-
parent that a county with a large Indian population could have
much of its money allocated to the Indians rather than to the
county government
.
Chart I on the following page depicts diagrammatically
the intrastate distribution of revenue charing funds among the
coun"cies, townsnips, and municipalities of a state.
Change of Allocation Formulas
The Revenue Sharing Act includes a provision permitting
states to modify the allocation formula to be used in distributing
funds to the local units of government. This allows the states
to shift the weight of general tax effort factors and relative
income factors in the allocation of funds. A state may exercise
this option Just once during the five-year term of the program.
Such action requires the enactment of a public law by the state.
The state must also notify the Secretary of the Treasury not
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period to v;hich the new law applies. The Secretary then will
certify that the ntate law complies with all re'iulrornents of
the local option foi'nula, and that the lav; will allocate to
local (';overn!r.ents all funds to which they arc entitled under
the Act for each pay period tJirouch December 31, 1976. Any such
1
law :nu.:'.t apply unlfoi'miy throup;hout the state.
Auditing
Auditing v;ill be conducted by a staff of about 25 accoun-
tants vjho will be used to back up normal state, city, county
and tov/n audits. Of the 39,000 different governments entitled
to revenue sharing funds each year, about 300 will receive routine
audits on a stati^^tical sample basis. In addition, tl.crc will
be specldl auuios la cases oi irregularlcies , racial discrimina-
2
tion cases, and v-age problem cases.
-^Ibid . , Sec. 108.
^Ibid. , Sec. 123.

CHAPTER VI
PURPOSES FOR V/HICH REVENUE SHARING FUNDS
WILL BE USED
General
Information from several sources was used in order to
drav/ conclusions concerning the uses to which revenue sharing
funds are being, and v;ill be, directed. Personal interviews
were conducted v;ith officials of some 40 local governments in
8 different states to solicit their opinions concerning the
revenue sharing program and ascertain the Intended disposition
of funds under the program.. Other information was obtained
from the Council of State Governments, the Senate Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental Relations, and various magazine and news-
paper articles
.
One cominon them^e emerged from the personal interviews
:
local (Tovernments are proceeding on the assumption that revenue
sharing is only a temporary program and that it v;ill not be
extended after its present five-\'ear life. Som.e of the offi-
cials interviewed expressed the personal belief that the pro-
gram v.'ould become perm.anont, but at the same time v/ere unv;ill-
ing to base their budgetary projections on this belief. There-




be directing their r.oriey tov;ard capital iinprovcrnento or pro-
l^ruinr. of a liniited dur-ation, i.e., activities tiiat v;ill not
require contip.uouG fundlnc over an extended period of time.
In recional briefinr;3 conducted for the benefit of
local officials, the Office of Revenue Sharing has urged that
a conservative approach be taken in the use of revenue sharing
funds, and has presented certain suggested guidelines for
expenditures, guidelines that emphasize the possible limited
life of the program. These guidelines are not binding at all,
inasmuch as governmental units are free to spend their money
in a wide range of programs, so long as the specific limitations
of the 1972 Act are observed. Since the Office of Revenue
Sharing is an agency of the Treasury Department, its advice on
spending inay reflect a tacit decision already made by the
Administration to eliminate the revenue sharing program after
the initial period elapses.
A noticeable shift in the attitude of local officials
was observed in the interviev/s conducted in late January and
February, as opposed to those conducted in December and early
January. In the earlier interviev/s an optimistic, grateful
attitude seemed to prevail. Officials spoke of hov; the new
funds v;oald allow them to complete certain projects that had
been planned for some time, but for which there had been in-
sufficient funds available. Revenue sharing would permit
"'Saraji 3. P'.eseker, City Clerk, Hartselle, Alabama,
private interview held December 26, 1972.

7^5
the local covernmentr, to build their new fire departments,
police stations, recreational facilitioG, etc., v;ithout the
imposition of new taxes. Almost without exception, the offi-
cliil:-^ interviewed lookt.'d upon revenue charih-- as a codsond.
In contrast to this earlier euphoria, however, the
officials interviewed most recently tend to view the program
with suspicion. V/hile they are happy to be receiving money
from V/ashington, there is apprehension that some other Fed-
erally supported programs may be curtailed. The budgetary
confrontation that has emerged between Congress and the White
House in recent weeks has clearly had an effect on local gov-
ernments and their plans for use of revenue sharing funds.'
In the earlier interviews most officials could point
to tentative planes foi ^hich x-evenue snai'ing lunas would oe
used, but in the later interviev/s a v;ait-and-see approach
has emerged. Since there is no requirement to spend the
money in the immediate future, there is a feeling that no
definite plans should be made until the extent of cuts in
other areas, if any, is known. Some governments, therefore,
have deposited their funds in interest-drav;ing accounts v/ith
the intent of v/aiting a year or so before making the final
decision as to their use.
In general, ther-o seems to be very little predisposition
by local governments to reduce taxes, though this is being
done in seme cases. 7hi^ tv;o reasons most often extended for

this ntand v.'ere that rf-'vr-nue nharinr; fundn v;ould pormit only
a MQV'j oiTiall reduction in the tax rate, no small tfiat mont
people v;ould not realize the difference, and that a tax re-
duction v/a3 politically dancerouL: in that a tax increase
would be necessary in a few years if the revenue sharing pro-
gram is terminated. It was felt that voters v/ould tend to
forget the tax reduction after a couple of years. Additionally,
most officials believe that their constituencies favor using
the funds for "extras," projects that could not otherwise have
been funded.
Local officials interviev/ed in December and early January
credited revenue sharing for stabilizing the local tax rate,
asserting that without this money a tax increase wculd have
Deen Inevitable. Those interviewed in late January and Feb-
ruary reserved judgment on this point. Some felt that if Fed-
eral programs are cut in other areas, a tax increase might
still pi'ove necessary.
In summary, the early elation by local officials over
the pro:-pect of revenue sharing funds has given vray to an
attitude of cautious optimism at best, and deep pessimism at
v;orst, concei-ning the ultimate benefits of the program. In
the fir.'Jil analysis, revenue sharing may be the vehicle for
a net reduction of Federal funds to local governments.
Intendod Uses of Revenue Charinr l''unds by Localities
A cor.pp'ndium of the Intervlev.'s conducted in this sur-
vey is included in ADDendix II. Come officials interviewed
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merely indicated that no doc ir Ion had been made concerninr;
how tli'jlr fund::; would be uned. Brief and unlnformat ive inter-
views of thin type were not written up for inclusion in Appen-
dix II.
A more definitive concept of how revenue sharinp; funds
are expected to be used can be formed by consideration of the
following examples :1
(1) Gainesville, Florida, (pop. 64,510), will use its
$807,2^8 from the first two payments (half received on
December 1, 1972, and half on January 1, 1973) for cap-
ital expenditures, primarily street improvements, sew-
age systems, and recreational facilities. None will
be applied toward tax reduction.
(2) Alachua County, Florida, (pop. 10^,764), of which
Gainesville is the county seat, v;ill use one-third of
its funds each year for tax reduction. The reduction
will amount to about one m.ill. The county is undecided
on how to spend tlie renainlnp: tv/o-i:hirds . but orob-
ably in the general category of capital expenditures.
(3) Hartselle, Alabama, (pop. 7,355), plans to avoid
spending on programs of a continuing nature. Funds
from the first two checks will be spent for street im-
provements, a new road grader, and a nev/ dump truck.
(4) Decatur, Alabama, (pop. 38,044), v;ill place its
revenue sharing funds in a supplement to the regular
budget. One-third of the funds are to be used to up-
grade presently underfunded departments, and two-thirds
for capital expenditures, specifically street improve-
ments, nev; fire department equipm.ent, and a drainage
project. Decatu." has a moderate tax rate and does not .
intend to use a;, ,7 funds for tax reduction.
(5) Huntsville, Alabana, (pop. 137,302), has deposited
its funds in an Intei'es t-bearing account and has made no
definite plans ."or its use, except that it villi not be
used for tax re'iuction.
Refer to interviews in Appendix II.
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(6) F.riGt Grant;.-, Connecticut, (pop. 3532), v;lll u::e
Its money for capital expenditures that had already
been planr.ed: a I'oad conDtruction truck," a police
cruiGer, and land fill scales and a scale house for
the tov.-n dump. East Granby's first tv;o payments amount
to $4l,S86.
(7) Suffleld, Connecticut, (pop. 8,63^), plans to use
its funds for a nev; r^arariQ, a drainage project, and
partial payment of a nev; bridge. Accordinr; to the mayor,
a tax increase v/ould definitely have been necessary wlthi-
out these funds.
(8) Windsor Locks, Connecticut, (pop. 15,080), v;ill use
part of its funds for bond reduction and part for capital
expenditures, probably street improvements. Windsor
Locks is skeptical of the program's future and is pro-
ceeding very cautiously.
(9) Chicopee, Massachusetts, (pop. 66,676), estimates
that two-thirds of its funds v;ill b'e required to stab-
ilize property taxes. A tax increase would have been
necessary but for the assistance provided by the revenue
sharing program. The remaining amount v;ill be used for
capital expenditures in the public safety, environmental
(10) Manchester, Connecticut, (pop. ^7,99^), intends to
use its funds for revitalizing the main shopping area of
town. This v/ill be done by spending the money for high-
way and sidev/alk construction. Manchester feels that
improving both pedestrian and automobile traffic flow
to the shopping area v;ill yield long range business and
tax benefits to the town.
(11) Granby, Connecticut, (pop. 6,150), has invested its
money in a trust fund at 5 3/^% interest for a period of
one year. The tov.'n expects to spend the money on a
library, an additional patrolman, and radio equipment for
police cars and town trucks, but v;ants to v.'ait a year
before making a firm decision. There is uncertainty
concerning the renuine purposes of the program, and
Granby is in no hurry to commit itself.
(12) Simu/Dury, Connecticut, (pop. 17, '175), is departing
from the standards follov;ed by most other tov/ns and is
planning to use its money for other than capital expend-
itures or tax r-duction. Simsbury's money will be spent
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to enlarge the police department staff, the hl£;hv;ay de-
partment, and to hire a new finance director. Some of
the money will probably be spent for road improvements
as well, but most of it Is going for programs that will
require continuous funding, whether or not revenue shar-
ing is extended after five years.
(13) Torrlngton, Connectlclt, (pop. 31,952), will use
Its money for capital expenditures already planned. Rev-
enue sharing funds will enable the town to speed up the
completion of these programs, which include a new garage,
bridge and highway repairs, and extension of storm and
sanitary sewer systems.
(1^) Brattleboro, Vermont, (pop. 12,239) is using its
money for an unusual purpose. The city is required by a
recent state law to change to a fiscal year accounting
system (July 1 - June 30) no later than July 1, 1977.
The first budget under the new system must cover 18 months
rather than the normal 12. Therefore, Brattleboro plans
to shift" to the new system in July of this year and use
its revenue sharing funds to support the additional six
months of the budget.
(15) V/oodstock, Vermont, (pop. 2,608), will use its funds
for the construction of a nev: fire station.
(16) Concord, New Hampshire, (pop. 30,022), plans to use
its money for capital expenditures already planned. There
will be no nev; programs. Without revenue sharing funds a
tax increase would have been necessary.
(17) East Hartford, Connecticut, (pop. 57,583), admits
to having no real need for revenue sharing funds . This
city has a lot of heavy Industry that provides substantial
tax revenues to the community. Property taxes in East
Hartford are lov;er than most of the state. The city has
not made specific plans for the use of its money, but v;ill
probably use it for Improvements in the police and fire
departments. A tax reduction of 3-5 mills is also planned
(18) Nev; Haven, Connecticut, (pop. 137,707) is v;orrled
that cuts in other Federal programs are going to be made.
New Haven needs the funds badly, but is making no plans
for their expenditure until the extent of cuts in other
programs is known. There will definitely be no tax cut.
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(l^O Wethernfield, Connecticut, (pop. ?6,662), r.-'-lr,
that the revenue charing procran does not der.crve all the
favorable publicity it has been receiving;. The Town Man-
ager believes that che regulations governing the program
v:ill continue to grov/. V/ethersfield v;ill u::o its money
to stabilize taxes, primarily by paying for capital ex-
penditures already planned.
(20) Aurora, Colorado, (oop. 7^,97^), plans to spend
its money zo remodel a public golf course.
(21) Glenarden, Maryland, (pop. ^,'1^7), intends to use
its funds to expand the town hall to hold larger crowds
at the weekend cabaret dances held there.
(22) Laurel, I-'aryland, (pop. 10,525), is planning on
using some of its money to buy the old National Guard
Armory in the city and turn it into a recreation center.
(23) Bowie, Maryland, (pop. 35,028), v;ill use its share
for capital expenditures, primarily for road improve-
ments.
Intended Uses of Revenue Sharing Funds by States
As discussed elsewhere in this paper, most of the state
governments have projected surpluses for the current fiscal
year, and many have huge surpluses to look forv;ard to. Revenue
sharing funds are therefore not as crucial to financial planning
by the state governments as for the local governments.
Local governmenus are proliibited by the 1972 Act from
using revenue sharing funds for educational purposes, but state
governmerits have no such restriction. Coveral states, including
California, I.'c-v; Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia v;ill
use the majority of their revenue sharir.g funds to assist the
Iccal g ^ver;.;,. lit.; In upgrading the school systems. Governor
^"Tne Fiscal Forecast is Fine for the States," Pur.iness
V.eek
,
:'ebruary 17, l'r'7 3, p. 68.

so
Ton McCall of Orepon will i^ubrnit a plan to the state leplnlature
tliat v;ll] corr.plctoly rcvir.c the school financial structuro such
that the state provides 100 percent of the operatlnr; costs of
elementary and secondary schools. Revenue sharing funds v;ill be
directed tov;ard this goal, with a substantial decrease expected
1
in local property taxes.
Several other states plan on using their money to help
lower the property taxes at the local level. In some cases
property tax reductions v;ill result from increased state aid
to education, in Oregon for example. Other states v;ill use
their revenue sharing funds in a more direct manner to per-
mit reduction of property taxes. South Dakota intends to
fund a major reform of the state and local tax structure with
its snare, Illinois, Kansas, Marylana, Minnesota, Vermont,
V/ashington, V/isconsin, and California all have some form of
2direct funding to local governments to allow a property tax cut.
Some states, to be- sure, will use their funds to embark
upon nev; programs. "ontana v;ill finance capital projects author-
ized by the state legislature, but for v;hich the bonding program
v.'as voided by the courts. Louisiana plans to use its revenue
to finance an expanded highv;ay construction and maintenance
program. South Carolina expectr. to effect major expansions in
the fields of health care, crim.inal justice, and education v;ith






the areas of early childhood development, includlnn statev/lde
klnderrartenr, v/}i1cii the ctate does not presently have, mental
health, and correctional Institutions.
In surariary , state f-.ovcrnmcnts ai'o expected to use their
funds to improve the school systems, finance local property
tax reductions, and establish new social v/elfare prot;:rams
.





A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF REVENUE SHARING
Tiie proponents of Federal revenue sharing have based
their support of this program on the follov/ing propositions,
among others
:
(1) That state and local governments face a common fis-
cal crisis, that they are financially unable to provide the
services required of them, and that they have only limited
recourse to raise additional funds at their level. The states
have exhausted the sources of revenue available to them, par-
tic ulciriy since tne I'eaerai government has preempted the major
source of revenue, the income tax.
(2) That revenue sharing is an equitable method of
raising money to meet state and local needs and is an efficient
method for meeting public expenditure requirements at these
levels
.
(3) That additional sources of revenue are necessary for
state and local governments because the need for funds at these
levels v/ill --.rov: more rapidly than- revenue in the future.
(^) That revenue sharing v.'ill help restore traditional
American der^ocratic principles by r-,jturnlng r.ore pov;er and




authority to the lower echelon (governments. Revenue sharlnr;
v/ill not only expand the activities of the ntate ar;J IocmI
governments, but v.-ill contribute to the equally desirable
.^.oal of retarding the j-rov.'th of the Federal covernment
,
(5) That states will have practically no restrictions
on the use of shai-ed funds, and that local governments, while
having more restrictions than the state governments, will still
have considerable leeway in the expenditure of shared funds,
C6) That the Federal government is assuming only a
limited financial obligation for a limited period of time (five
years).
(7) That this program can be administered v;ith very
little growth in the Federal bureaucracy and with the imposition
of only a few administrative procedures on the recipient govern-
ments.
(8) That there is little alternative to revenue sharing
if local governments are to continue as a viable part of our
governmental structure.
(9) That funds made available to state and local govern-
ments are designed to encourage them to expand their revenue
efforts, cither by greater use of income taxes or other revenue
.:ources. In other v.'ords, the bill helps the state and local
governments to help themselves.
The above orooositions v.'ill each be exam.ined and discussed

in order to access the validity of the accumptlonc on which
they are based.
The Flccal Crlr.ir. of State and Local Gov^^rnmontc
The Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 ic based on the assumption
that all states and localities face a common fiscal crisis. Some
states and localities clearly are confronted by a crisis of this
type, despite a high tax burden on their citizens; but on the
other hand, many localities have not exhausted their own resources
or even strained themselves. For example, six states have no
income tax whatsoever, four others use it in a narrowly selective
way, and in Fiscal Year 1971, individual income tax collections
represented less than one percent of personal income in 22
states.^ State and local officials quite naturally prefer ob-
taining "free" funds from V/ashlngton rather than face their con-
stituencies on the issue of taxes.
The financial situations of the various state and local
governments vary so enormously that it is very difficult to
generalize. The most accurate generalization, however, must
surely be that the potential sources of revenue available to
these governments have not been exhausted. It was pointed out
above 'that the state income tax has not .been vlrogously applied
by most states. Viev/in*-^ the state income tax from a slightly
H.R. 14370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Committee on
Vv'ays and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Report with
Sur-p! '-menti 1 , Additional, and Dicr-ontln^" Viev;s (to Accompany
H.r;'. iii370), p. ::.

different pcrnnectivo, despite the claim that the Federal gov-
ernment has preempted thin major source of revenue, r.lx ctaten
(Hav;ali, Minnesota, Mev; York, IJorth Dakota, Oregon, and V/incon-
cin) cui'rcntly dei'lve a conoluc-rable proportion of their total
revenues from this source. The other 44 states fall far belov/
this level, imposing a very lev; rate of taxation or not util-
izing the state income tax at all.
Other taxation measures also remain unexploited. Five
states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon)
have no general sales tax, and of the others that do, the rate
2
exceeds ^% in only seven states. Six stat-es (Nevada, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and V/yoming) do not impose
a corporate income tax, and the taxation rate is very lov; in
many of the states that do employ it. Although property is
taxed by all local governments, the rates are several times
higher in some states than in others.
There is no intent to claim that the tax systems and
bases of all the 50 states should be the same, but the tremen-
dous variation that exists are difficult to justify. The ines-
capable conclusion is that the states differ greatly not only
in their taxation effort, but also in their willingness to meet
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United State:-: ]97'', (93rd Edition), V/ashlngton, D.C.: 1972,
pp. 412-413.
o
""nev/spaper Enterprise Association, Inc., The 197 3
V/orld Almanac and F^ok of Fact s, Ilev/spaper Enterprise
Associauio:., Inc., :;-;•.•,' York, 1973, PP . 107-108.




their own social oblir^atlons
. It r.eemr, clear beyond doubt that
the ri:r\]orlt:y of tiie states could increase their revenues sub-
stantially by rcquirinp; the snme sacrifices from their citizens
as a fev; conscientious states are dcinc, I'athor than uaitlnc
for the Federal government to come along and solve their problems
Some states have, in fact, recently taken steps to ex-
ploit these additional sources of revenue. Florida has a pro-
jected surplus of $300 million for 1973 due to its newly adopted
corporate income tax, and within the last two years Ohio and
Pennsylvania joined the ranks of those states having state Income
taxes. States have long been reluctant to impose personal and
corporate income taxes for fear that new industry will be dis-
couraged by states that do adopt these measures. These sta.tes
should realize that it is not enough for an industry to simply
bring jobs to a community, though this is certainly an important
consideration. An industry should also contribute to the com-
munity by direct taxation. Most communities v;ould be better off
not having the industry if significant tax incentives must be
offered in order to attract the industry in the first place.
Industries, like individuals, require services from the
com::iunity, and like individuals, should be taxed to defray the
expenses for these services.
Eouitv of Pevenue Sharinr^
From the orevious discussion of varying tax policies
"""The Fi-jcal Forecast is Fine for the States," Rusine:
'ebruary 17, lii73, p. 63.
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of the different state and local covorninentc , It Ic; apparent
that ir.divldualL; in the ::.arne income bi'acket are taxed diff-
erently dopendlnc on their domiciles. Even though I'evenue
Gharlnc lias certain Income redistribution features, the bill
places great emphasis on the tax efforts of state and local
governments, and encourages the maintenance of high taxes.
Therefore, the existing Inequity is likely to be perpetuated.
The major point is that our present system of taxation treats
people in the same income bracket differently simply because
they live in different places, and revenue sharing does little
to redress these inequities.
Revenue sharing as an efficient method for meeting pub-
lic expenditure requirements at the state and local level can
be directly challenged on the basis that it will help perpetuate
the existing inefficient structure of many local governments.
The problems of many local governments can be traced to the fact
that there is duplication of many services among various units
of government. Governm.ents often overlap one another to the
extent that several different levels m.ay tax the same parcel of
property. Their broadly divergent pov/er and fuiictions have
frequently i ed to unnecesr.ary conflicts and competition. Not
only v;lll revenue sharing help perpetuate this situation, but v;lll
H.iw l-i370, 92r.a Cong., 2d Sess. (1972): Committee on
V;ays and Means, U.3. lloure of Representatives, Report v/lth
Sunplemental, Additional, n >-:d Di:-:-entlnr Viov;s (to Accompany
K . R . 1 H 3 7 ;
,
p . 9 o .
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actually make It v/orse for this reason: r.lnce acrlr.tancc under
revenue criarln?' ic provided to every unit of local rovcrnment,
except those v;hose share Is computed to be less than $200, small
hamlets v;ill be encouraged to Incorporate and share in the
Federal bounty. Instead of maintaining the existing; fragmented
and overlappinc co^ernments, and indeed aggravating the problem,
pressures are needed to move local governments toward more co-
hesive, efficient units.
Need for Funds at State and Local Levels
Supporters of revenue sharing have frequently stated
that the need for funds at the state and local levels v/ill grow
1
more rapidly than revenues in the future. For quite a long
cime, especially during the late Fifties and most of the Sixties,
this was in fact the situation. The basic fallacy in assuming
that this v/ill continue in the future lies in extrapolating the
trends of the past decade over the decade ahead, v;ithout making
2the appropriate adjustments to reflect the changing society.
From the mid-Fifties to the mid-Sixties several import-
ant factors promoted a huge expansion of expenditures at the
state and local level. First, there v/as a backlog of requirements
^Melville J. Umler, "The Elementary Errors of Tax-
Sharing," Revenue Sharir. : and Its Alternatives: V/h-it Future
for Fiscal Fea-ra lisr:? , i-Jeport, 90tii Cong., 1st Sesj.,
(1967) ; preparv'd for i-he Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of
the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, V.'ashinr.uon, D.C.




for public facilitlec left over from the deprivations caused
by V.'orld V/ar II. Secondly, the postv.-ar "baby boom" resulted
in IncreaGln^p; cch.ool enrollments. At the same time, advances
in medical science and the adoption of iiealth and v;elfare
services caused the number of older citizens in the population
to increase substantially. These conditions tliat created the
great demand for public facilities are due to change significantly
during the next decade.
The backlog of needs from V/orld V/ar II has long since
been fulfilled. The birthrate in the U.S. reached its peak in
the late Fifties, and has declined to the point that today we
have almost reached "Zero Population Grov;th." In many areas
the enrollment in publi:^ schools has already started to decrease.
The "v;ar babies" are nov/ adults. The decline in school enroll-
ments v/ill becom.e even more m.arked as the results of our present
lov; birth rate begin to be felt in the next fev; years. Addition-
ally, the number of older citizens as a percentage of the popu-
2lation has stabilised. This, together v;ith the increased
support of the older cii^izens provided by recent increases in
Social Security and the adoption of Medicare, should ease the
demand for increased services from local units of government.
As a result of all T:hese factors, expenditures required
to maintain the present .'.cope of public services at the state
and local levels should :."ise bv a much small'-^r amount in the
1
2




next decade than In the past decade. In summary. It appears
that revenue sharing is a concept whose time has passed; but
Ironically, it was adopted Just as the future began to brighten
for state and local governments. In 196? the Committee for
Economic Development estimated that the required outlays by
state and local governments for public services in 1975 would
be $98.5 billion. From 1955 to I965, state and local expenditures
had increased by 123 percent.
At the same time, the Committee for Economic Development
projected the net revenue yield to state and local governments,
from the existing tax structure, at $119 billion in 1975, a
figure far in excess of the projected requirements. As a matter
of fact, in I969 the revenues realized by state and local gov-
2
ernments amounted to $114.5 billion.
The most recent information available concerning the
fiscal situation of state governments paints a rosy picture for
the future. Governor Ronald Regan of California was recently
quoted as saying that his state's budget outlook is "brighter
than it has been in years," and Governor Nelson Rockefeller of
New York declared that his state has "weathered the severe fiscal
3
crisis which beset us for the past two years."
Melville J. Ulmer. op. cit., p. 933.
^U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1971
,
(92nd edition) V.'ashlngton, D.C., 1971,
p. 406.
^"The Fiscal Forecast is Fine for the States," Business
Week
, February 17, 1973, p. 68.
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In a majority of the states there are budgetary balances
or surpluses for the foreseeable future, few nev: state taxes,
and in some states, even tax cuts. The follov/ing examples




(1) Florida v/ill have a surplus on the order of $300
million, due primarily to the long-overdue adoption of
a corporate income tax.
(2) Michigan is expecting a surplus of around $220
million for the current fiscal year. Governor Millken
lias proposed tax cuts for both individuals and corpor-
ations for the next two fiscal years.
(3) Pennsylvania is also sufficiently liquid to be con-
sidering a tax reduction for both individuals and corpor-
ations.
C^ ) Connecticut's budget for the current fiscal year
provided for a small surplus, while at the same time
i'edacing the sales tax from 1% to 6.5^ and repealing
some business taxes.
C5) Mississippi has an $80 million surplus of vjhich
at least part will be distributed to local governments
within the state.
(6) Georgia x»7ill use its $50 million surplus to either
z'educe property taxes or boost state aid to schools.
C7) California expects a whopping $850 million surplus
for the current fiscal year, and possibly $1.2 billion
±n the next. The governor wants to return most of the
surplus to taxpayers, whereas the legislators want to
iise the money for other purposes.
(8) Nex^: York has a projected surplus of $75 million
for the current year and wants to put $66 million of
t;his in a contingency fund, a plan that has brought





(9) Texas, a state v;ith no corporate or personal, income
tax, v;ill have a surplus of $50 million this year, due
primarily to higher sales and excise taxes.
There are some states, to be sure, that are findinp, it
difficuJLt to meet bud,^'5tary demands at present, and a few may
actually have to Increase taxes. The fact remains, however,
that state r.ovcrnnents in the aggregate had a surplus of $12.3
billion at the end of 1972, including $2.65 billion from revenue
sharine. This clearly indicates the ability of state govern-
ments not only to solve their ovin problems, but to assist the
local g^iivernments within the states. For example, the State of
Michigan with its substantial surplus should use some if its
funds to assist financially-distressed Detroit. This city is
in such poor financial condition that its schools may have to
2
close t'xrs months early due to lack of funas. hven so, the
state of Michigan appears to be oblivious to this situation,
and plar-s on cutting taxes rather than developing a plan to aid
some of its ov;n cities and communities.
This discussion has dealt v;ith revenues and expenditures
in the a-ggregate, and it cannot be denied that some local gov-
ernjnents will continue to experience fiscal difficulties. How-
ever, tnsre is ample evidence that the severest financial trials
of state and local governments have novj been ameliorated to the
extent that these problems can be solved in the overwhelming






Restoration of Pov;er and Authority to the Lower
Echelon Governmentn
President Nixon has repeatedly voiced his belief that
a "Hew Federalism" Is needed to bring governmental operations
closer to the people served thereby, and that a system of rev-
enue sharing villi result in both pov/er and money being returned
to the governmental units closest to the people. Unfortunately,
it is no simple matter to reverse the course of events over the
past century, and especially the last fifty years.
The role of the Federal government has expanded enor-
mously during this period of time due to several important
factors. One of these is the historic, inexorable trend to-
ward greater economic interdependence of American society that
transcends city, county, and state boundaries. The population
is. so mobile that the very concept of residents of a state begins
to lose meaning. The services provided by one affects all its
neighbors. In short, population mobility, industrialization,
and the advances in transportation and communications have molded
the nation into a cohesive whole. These historical trends are
not reversible, and the likelihood is that the Federal govern-
ment vjill grov; stronger, not v/eaker. The flow of a fev; billion
dollars to the state and local governments, along v/ith wide lat-
itude for their expenditure, v;ill not alter the existing pov;er
relationships betvieen Federal, state,* and local governments.
The American society v/ill continue to be molded by Fed-




standards for American society, the states have always been
led by the Federal government. There are many examples, but
the Civil Rights Act of 196^ readily comes to mind as an action
by the Federal government to alter longstanding social and eco-
nomic conditions existing in the various states. The Federal
government has pioneered other social legislation with the in-
evitable economic consequences.
The basic reason why many states have always lagged, and
will always lag, in adopting progressive legislation has to
do V7ith rhe competition among the states for industry, a prob-
lem previously alluded to. Some aspects of this competition
are socially unhealthy and economically self-defeating v/hen in-
dustry is lured to a state by sacrificing the v;elfare and best
interests of the state's own people. For example, a state may
decline to impose regulations on industry for limiting air or
water pollution for fear of conceding an advantage to another
state in attracting new industry. All states are better off if
the Feder-al government adopts legislation imposing a general
pollution standard that does not v/eaken any one state's competitive
posture for attracting industry. In summary, the Federal gov-
ernment has done for the states what they themselves were unv/illing
or unable to do, and by and large this has been for the betterment
of American society. Revenue sharing cannot, and indeed should
not, curtail the pov/er and authority of the Federal government.
^Melville J. Umler. op. cit., p. 935
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One final point regarding governmental authority and re-
sponsibility should be made. Public accountability is severly
undermined by a bill which divorces the responsibility for
raising taxes from the dispensation of public benefits. This
is a serious defect, because the public will be unable to measure
the performance of their elected officials at various govern-
mental levels by balancing the tax burdens imposed by these
officials against the public benefits they have provided.
Restrictions on the Use of Revenue Sharing Funds
The Revenue Sharing Act of 1972 places practically no
restrictions on the use of funds by state governments, and es-
tablishes certain categories of expenditures for v/hich local gov-
ernments may use their funds. State governments can apparently
be trusted, v;hereas- local governments apparently cannot be.
This is the ultimate paradox of the revenue sharing bill: leg-
islation purporting to revitalize local government and return
pov;er to the level of government closest to the people actually
expresses the leasz confidence in the wisdom and responsibility
of the government at that level.
The restrictions that are placed on the expenditure of
funds bear the marl: of a typical Congressional compromise. The
Senate version of r.he bill placed no restrictions on either the
state or local governments, v/hereas the House version v;ould have
^H.R. 1437G, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);, Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Report with
Supplemental, Additional, and Dissentin" Vievrs (to Accompany
Ii.R^ 14370), p. 89.
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placed firm restrictions on both. The ensuing compromise con-
tained elements of each VGr.:ion.
The present restrictions on local governments are some-
v;hat loose and allov; considerable room for maneuver by inno-
vative officials, but it should surprise no one if tighter and
more pervasive restrictions eventually ensue, assuming that
revenue sharing is extended beyond its present five-year life.
If past experience is any indication, there can be little doubt
that the dependence of state and local governments on Federal
largesse to meet their basic governmental responsibilities v;ill
result in the Federal government eventually prescribing how
these governments must meet their responsibilities.
Federal Obligation
The proponents of revenue sharing have emphasized that
the Federal governm.ent is assuming a limited obligation for a
limited period of time. Though the President originally envis-
ioned a permanent program, it noi-i seems likely that various
political forces vjill not want it extended after five years.
However, the same political pressures from lov/er levels of gov-
ernment that forced Congressional support of the bill in the
first place, may make it difficult to let the program die after
1976, especially during the period of a major election campaign
The program may v;ell prove to be permanent and ever rising in
its cost.
Ibid
. , p . 2.
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Even before the first checks v;ere distributed, important
officials v;ere already decrying the inadequacy of the annual
funds to be shared. Governor Nelson Rockefeller of Hew York,
testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee on behalf
of the National Governors' Conference, recommended that the
annual payment be doubled. Ten billion dollars "is absolutely
essential," he declared. In short, the same pressures respon-
sible for the present bill v/ill insure rapid growth of the
program to meet the Insatiable appetites of officials for rev-
enues they can use to finance benefits v;ithout the painful nec-
essity of imposing taxes.
Program Administration
The revenue sharing program envisions an administrative
situation that can be handled v;ith little growth in the Fed-
eral bureaucracy and with the imposition of only a few adminis-
trative procedures. If revenue sharing becomes a permanent pro-
gram, it seems highly probable that it will be accompanied by a
burgeoning bureaucracy. It is true that the program as presently
constituted takes advantage of existing facilities and perscmnel
levels of the Treasury Department to a large extent, but it must
be remenoered that the program is in its infancy. The first
round of reports have not yet been received from governmental






different governments already particlpatinc in the program, it
is Inconceivable that there will not be a deluge of problems to
be solved by the "experts" in V/ashington, D.C. There are thou-
sands of additional units of government in the country who are
potential participants in the program. V/ho is going to v;ork
out the problems concerning their eligibility for funds, their
late entrance into the program, the effect it v^ould have on
funds received by the presently participating governments, etc?
There can be little doubt that this program, like all other gov-
ernmental programs vjill experience grov/ing pains, and the pres-
cription for those pains will inevitably inyolve additional man-
power and facilities, bureaucracy, if you will.
Alternatives to Revenue Sharing
Revenue sharing has often been presented as the only
remaining hope for the salvation of our state and local govern-
ments. It has already been pointed out in the discussion on
taxes that most state and local governments are not even in need
of salvation. And in those few situations v;here some assistance
is required to allov: governments at this level to function ef-
fectively, there are other methods to achieve this goal v;ith
greater efficiency and a lesser expenditure of funds.
It is completely unjustifiable to dispense funds to all
units of government, as the present program does, simply because
a small minority of them require assistance. Hovrever, there is
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no easy solution to providing selective assistance simply be-
cause of political considerations. Any method that could be
devised v;ould be opposed by some pov-ierful interest groups. An
interesting analysis of alternative ways of distributing Fed-
eral funds v/as conducted by the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations (ACIR) in 196^. This commission, composed
of representatives from the three levels of government. Federal,
state, and local, v;as created by Congress in 1959 for the fol-
-1-1lowing purposes:
(1) To give critical attention to the conditions and
controls involved in the administration of Federal
grant programs.
(2) To recommend v^/ithin the framework of the Constitu-
tion, most desirable allocation of governmental
functions, responsibilities, and revenues among
the several levels of goverraiient
.
(3) To recommend m.ethods of coordinating and simpli-
fying tax lav7s and administrative practices to
achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal
relationship between the levels of government.
The ACIR analyzed the following alternatives for dis-
2tributing Federal funds: (1) The compensatory fiscal approach,
v/hich V70uld involve reduction in the Federal income tax, v;ith
the state and local governments presumably realizing the
Richard F. Kaufman, "Recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and Earlier Govern-
ment Commissions," Revenue Sharing and Its Alternatives:
Ivhat Future for Fiscal r-v-deralism? Report, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 19o7, prepared for the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy
of the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Com.mittee, V/ashington, D.C.:





opportunity to raise their own taxes, (2) the tax credit option
approach under which a more genersous v;rite-off of state and
local taxes toward payment of Federal income taxes is permitted,
again with the intent of providing an opportunity to raise state
and local taxes, (3) the tax sharing approach, a variation of
the revenue sharing approach that was eventually adopted. Under
this plan a designated percentage of Federal tax revenue v;ould
be distributed to the states on the basis of collection, (4)
the unconditional grant approach under which the states would be
left free to allocate the funds as they deemed best, (5) the
conditional grant approach under v:hich the Federal government
would decide on the function to be financed, and (6) the direct
federal expenditure approach under which the Federal government
would net only decide on the function to be financed, but expend
the money directly with no matching funds or participation from
the state and local governments.
The advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches
and the political considerations thereof will not be discussed in
any detail here. Suffice it to say that while it did not reject
the concept of revenue sharing, the ACIR felt that other approaches
should first be tried, \-7ith revenue sharing to be considered only
if the other methods prove ineffective. In particular, ACIR
gave strong support for the tax credit proposal and the Federal




that grants should be consolidated to achieve more efficiency
and eliminate fragmented programs, and most importantly, to
reflect differences in the states' relative fiscal capacities.
ACIR also placed importance on maintaining the relation betv.'een
taxing and spending responsibilities at the local level, and
in this regard took the position that fiscal reform by local
governments v^ould give them additional funds by making more
effective use of their ov/n taxing pov/ers
.
It can be seen, therefore, that alternatives to revenue
sharing do exist that vmuld put the money v;here the necessity
can be demonstrated, but would not distribute funds to every
unit of government. At the same time, efficiency on the part
of local goverriments V70uld be encouraged and the concept of
responsibility and accountability to the people would be main-
tained.
Expansion of Taxation Efforts by State
and Local Governnenrs
As v;e have seen, the state income tax is not being used
to the maximum extent possible in most areas. The increased use
of it is an avov/ed goal of revenue sharing. This highlights
another paradox of the revenue sharing program. On the one
hand it is claimed that most states are in desperate need of
assistance from the Federal government. Cn the other hand, the
government explicitly recognizes the ability of the state
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governments to raise substantial additional revenues without
placlnc an undue burden on the population of the state. The
"piggyback" collection provision of the 1972 act expressly
acknov;ledges that state governments are not doing enough to
solve their own problems.
The revenue sharing bill also is designed to encourage
additional taxation effort at the local level. This v:as pointed
out in the discussion of the "three-factor formula" and the
"five-factor formula" in Chapter V. Since the major source of
revenue at the local level derives from the property tax, the
bill implicitly encourages maintenance of taxation effort in this
area. This is in direct conflict with one of the goals of rev-
enue sharing frequently expressed by President Nixon, that of
providing relief from property taxes at the local level.
The revenue sharing program abounds with paradoxes and
inconsistencies. Revenue sharing v/as enacted at a time when
state governments vjere finally moving tov/ard long needed change
to solve the problem.s of local governments within those states.
In the area of education, for example, an area that consumes ^3
percent of local budgets and in v/hich 95 percent of the local
tax revenue for education is derived from property taxes, several
state courts (including California, Texas, Minnesota, and Nev:
Jersey) have issued decisions that may require states to provide
nearly all the costs of public education. Presumably this v:ould
H.R. 1^1370, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess^ (1972); Committee 'on
V.-ays and Means, U.S. Plouse of Representat^es , Report H:ith
Sur'Dlemental, Additional, and Dissenting- Vievjs (to Accompany -
H.r". 1^370), p. 10 6.
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have to be accomplished throuf^h a state Income tax, clnce the
rulings explicitly stated that linking education to property
taxes discriminated against the poorer area. V/hy not let the
state courts complete its v;ork in this regard? It is reasonable
to believe that the states could support public schools through
an income tax, with local governments utilizing the property




As finally enacted into law under the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, revenue sharing emerged as a
type of "pork barrel" program designed to give maximum political
benefit to Senators and Representatives in Congress. The case
for revenue sharing v;as built on several erroneous assumptions,
the most important being that most state and local governments
are in serious financial straits, and further, that they do not
have the fiscal resources at their disposal for solving their
Based on the limited number of personal interviews con-
ducted with officials of local governments, there appears to be
little urgency in expending the funds received through the nev;
revenue sharing program. Various newspaper and magazine articles
tend to substantiate the belief that while revenue sharing funds
are gleefully accepted by state and local governments, as one
would expect, there is nothing to indicate that revenue sharing
was necessary, in the vast majority of cases, for the continued
viability of the- recipient governments.
Revenue sharing as first proposed in the early 19^0 's




in 1969, V7as based on the concept of sharing surplus revenues
v;ith state and local governments on the basis of population and
the degree to v;hich their own tax resources were being utilized.
When it became apparent that there v/as little chance of having
any surpluses to share, Mr. Nixon embraced revenue sharing as
part of a deficit budget, but hoped to use this program as a
vehicle for consolidating the grant-in-aid programs under the
special revenue sharing aspect of his plan.
The resulting program contained the worst of both worlds.
A nationv/ide expectation had arisen, largely due to the intense
lobbying and public activity on the part of organizations of
state and local officials, whereby manna from V/ashlngton would
flovj to every commiunity to enhance its lot without cost to anyone
•rne very apt economist's homily, "there is no such thing as a
free lunch," v;as completely Ignored in the great clamor for
Washington to dispense its presumably endless largesse. As a
result, a program. v;as adopted for the debt-ridden Federal govern-
ment to distribute $30 billion over a period of five years to
lov;er goverrjnent v;hlch are by-and-large In much stronger fiscal
condition than is V/ashlngton. Additionally, no economies in
other- areas v/ere realized^ as the President had hoped. No sub-
stantial lncen::lves v/ere adopted to make state ^and local govern-
ments more effective and no restructuring of the many overlapping
governmental functions was achieved. In short, everything is
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the same as before, except that the Federal government Is further
in debt.
State and local officials are happy to receive the money,
of course, but if they had the v/ill and the wisdom to look at
the nationv^ide affects of revenue sharing, taking into consider-
ation both sides of the ledger, there can be little doubt that
in the aggregate, the country is v/orse off for having adopted
this program. The only v;ay it could have improved the condition
of the entire country v/ould have been through the reorganization
of inefficient units of government or by an overhaul of the tax
structure. The A.ct of 1972 does neither.
Some mileage from revenue sharing may yet be obtained by
President Nixon. Though It was not in the original scheme of
things, it appears now that the President may use revenue snaring
as an excuse for cutting back on other programs. Mr. Nixon has
received much publicity recently for his proposed dismantlement
of many "Great Society" programs adopted in the 1963 's. The
Administration could alv:ays point to revenue sharing as a means
for local governments to continue some of the programs for which
funds are terminated. There have already been hints from Admin-
istration spokesmen that revenue sharing m^ay be used to ease the
way for cutbacks in other areas
.
The Research Questions
In response to the primary research question, the in-




Federal revenue sharing will help maintain the status quo of
taxation policies of state and local governments, at least for
the five-year life established under the initial legislation.
If revenue sharing becomes a permanent program after this trial
period, tax policies might change substantially.
This conclusion is based primarily on the following
factors
:
Cl) Many local governments that could afford to reduce
taxes as a result of revenue sharing are not doing so
for fear that the program may be terminated after five
years, necessitating a tax increase at that time. Most
officials feel that the public is not clamoring for a
tax reduction and v:ill remain satisfied if taxes are
kept at the present level.
(2) Most officials interviev/ed asserted that a tax in-
crease would have been necessary if revenue sharing had
not been adopted when it was. While this is probably
ez^iaggerated in somiS cases, it does indicate that tax
levels in most states and communities will remain at
the present level.
(3) V/hile the 1972 Act does contain an incentive for the
Increased tax effort of state and local government, the
incentive is not all that strong. For one thing, the
choice of two formulas for distribution of funds allov;s
those states v.'ithout income taxes to choose the "three-
factor formula" that does not penalize them. For an-
other, even though both formulas contain a General Tax
Effort Factor to reward those states collecting a higher
per capita tax, this factor is not strong enough in re-
lation to other factors to encourage governments to take
the political risky step of increasing taxes. Lastly,
it is incongruous for the Federal governjnent to adopt
a law that ostensibly encourages additional tax effort
by state and local governments, and at the same time
provides money that obviates the need for the tax effort
that has been encouraged.
The "piggyback" income tax collection feature of the
Revenue Sharing Bill is not likely to stimulate additional use
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of tlie state income tax. None of the states without an income
tax are experiencing fiscal deficits at the present time. More-
over, in a preponderance of the states the budpjetary outlook
for the 1973 legislative session is brighter than it has been in
years. Unless some of the states decide to adopt a revenue
sharing plan of their ov;n for distribution of state funds to
local governments J an extremely unlikely event in view of the
Federal revenue sharing program, there should be no need for
increases in state income taxes. Some states may, however,
choose to utilize the services of the Federal government in col-
lecting state income taxes as provided by the "piggyback" feature,
while retaining the present level of taxation.
In short, state and local governments (in the vast major-
ity of cases) are experiencing the combined blessings of a
resurgent economy, a leveling off of demands for services from
the older segment of the population, a decrease in school enroll-
ment, and "free" funds from Washington in the amount of $30
billion over a five year period. There is little reason to alter
taxation policies for the foreseeable future.
During the Congressional legislative process, the revenue
sharing concept evolved as follovjs:
(1) From a proposal to share surplus revenues, initially
in the amount of about $500 million per year, to a massive
program of assistance v;ithout regard to budgetary deficits,
with $5". 3 billion available the first year.
(2) Fromi a proposal to channel all shared revenues through
the state governments, v/ith the state government retaining
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more than hnlf, to a syr:tern of direct r^^antr. from the Fed-
eral covernment to each unit of lovier novernment, v/lth
state covernnentn receiving one-third arid local /govern-
ments recelvlni:; tv;o-thirds.
(3) From a relatively simple allocation plan wherein
money v;ould be distributed on the basis of population
and tax effort, to a dual system of complex plans under
which the factors of need, use of state income tax, and
urbanized population are used in addition to overall
population and overall tax effort.
(4) From a plan p-rantin.f^ funds to all units of govern-
ment without "strings," to a compromise plan under v/hich
the states have no restrictions, but under which local
governments must use their money for certain priority
categories of expenditures.
(5) From a plan that envisioned the sharing of a certain
percentage of Federal revenues over an indefinite period
of time, to one under v;hich specific dollar amounts were
appropriated over a specified period of time.
(6) From a plan that favored rural areas to one that
favoi's everyone, due uo the two allocation formulas avail-
able. In reality, suburban areas are not particularly
favored by either of the formulas, whereas rural areas
and core cities both are, depending on the formula
selection.
All the changes discussed in the preceding paragraph
entailed political trade-offs and compromises between the exec-
utive and legislative branches, and betv;een various factions
of the Congress. In general, the House advocated features that
would benefit the more populous urban regions, while the Senate
had the more rural interests at heart. Also, the House advocated
tight restrictions on the use of funds, v/hereas the Senate was
inclined to grant funds without restriction on their usage. The
House fought vigorously to include incentives for the use of
state income taxes, while the Senate objected to this goal and
managed to v.-ater-down this provision considerably.
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There v/er-o r.onio polntc of unanimity betv;c-en the Houne
and Senate, hov.'ev(.>r. Both Tavored direct distribution of fundr.
to each unit of f^overnnent , rather th^an c^^-^i^^^C the state f'ov-
ernnentj control over funds eai'ir.arked for local co"^ernments , as
the President liad proposed. Additionally, both ar.reed that local
governments should receive the majority of the money, v;hereas
the President's plan v/ould have granted the majority to the
state governments . The House and Senate both employed similar
procedures to avoid giving control of the legislation to the
Plouse and Senate Appropriations Committees and to avoid the
necessity for annual appropriations procedures.
Additionally, both the House and the Senate refused to
consider v:hat v;as probably the most intelligent and farsighted
proposal made during the v;hole legislative process: the pro-
vision of the aborted Humphrey-Reuss plan of 1971 that v/ould have
required state and local governments to enact master plans for
modernization prior to participating in revenue sharing. If
the final revenue sharing legislation had contained a provision
for modernization of local governments to eliminate some of the
overlapping functions, perhaps it v/ould have been v/orth the $30
billion that is to be handed out.
The revenue sharing program appears to be functioning
v/ell insofar a.s the administration of the program is concerned.
A series of regional m.eotings has been conducted by the Office
of Revenue Sharing to acquaint officials of state and local

Ill
Governr.cnts v;ith Iho i-Oj-ulal Ions and pi'ocedureG established by
the 197^^ Act. Officials interviev/od seemed to be v;ell infor'med
concerning their responsibilities under the act. The machinery
estaulished to administer the procr'am is viewed favorably by
these officials, and the amount of governmental "red tape" has
been held to a minimum.
It is quite clear that the local coverrments are using
their revenue sharing funds for projects of limited duration or
for capital expenditures, i.e., for programs that v;lll not require
funding over a long period of time. There is considerable doubt
in the minds of the mayors and city managers 'that revenue sharing
v^ill be extended after the initial five-year period. They are
"playing it safe" and planning expenditures in such a v;ay that
taxation can be kept at the present level. Revenue sharing has
therefore enabled governmental units to buy nev; equipment, erect
nev/ buildings, or pave nev/ streets, all projects that would
othervrise have not been accomplished. Many governments have
used funds for projects that clearly are not "must" items. The
most flagrant exa.mple is probably the city that is using its
money to renovate the golf course.
In general, revenue sharing has permitted communities
to puro^^.ase "nice to have" projects, but fev; seem to have
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APPENDIX II
SUMMARY 0? INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WITH
OFFICIALS OF LOCAL GOVERNMEI.'TS
Gainer.villo, Florida (population 6^,510)
Person inlcrviev^ed : City Manacer, Mr. B. Harold Farmer
Date of Interviev;: December 20, 1972
Gainesville is a rapidly grov/ing city in central Florida
that has doubled its population in the last decade. The city
is to receive approximately $807,2^l8 in the first tv;o checks,
spaced only a month apart. Gainesville Intends to use its
money for capital improvements and a fev; programs that '-'ill
have a limited life and a specific date established for their
demise. The intention is to avoid any program that v;ould re-
quire funding from local resources in the event revenue sharing
is eliminated after the initial five year period.
Mr. Farmer v:as extremely cordial and helpful, as v/ell as
frank and open, during the interviev/. He stated that his
efforts v;ill be directed not only to the v;ise expenditure of
the funds received, but also for building a case for extend-
ing revenue sharing beyond the present five year life estab-
lished by the 1972 Act. He feels this is particularly neces-
sary in that the Congressman representing Gainesville's dis-




Gainesville v/111 not apply any of the fund:; toward a
property tax reduction. The tv;d major rca:3ona for thir. are
that t>io taxation rate could be reduced only by such a ."iriall
amount (approximately 3,^1 niill) that the individual taxpayer
v;ould "nardly feel the benefit therefrom, and it is feared
that a tax cut nov; v;ould necessitate a tax increase in five
years if revenue sharing is not extended.
Mr. Farmer appeared to be a city manager very much attuned
to the times. He stated that a portion of the city's revenue
sharing money v;ould be spent to finance a study on bond funding
and for a system of program evaluation. He feels that the rules
for the expenditure of revenue sharing funds and the administrative
procedures involved are easy to comply v/lth, but he is wary of
the role that GAO might play. Mr. Farmer also fears that the
Federal government mright use revenue sharing as an excuse to
curtail other assistance such as grants-in-aid.
Alachua County, Florida (population 104,764)
Person interviev;ed: Coordinator, Office of Federal Aid
Program^s, Mr. Norm LaCoe
Date of interviev;: December 20, 1972
Alachua County is the county in v:hich the city of
Gainesville is located, Gainesville being the county sea.t and
largest city. Alac};ua County is one of the fev; governmental
units surveyed that intends to effect an actual tax reduction
using revenue sharin?: funds. Quite a few other units indicated
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tliat revenue charinr, lirid obviated the necesi:lty of irripo^inc;
hichor taxe::: , l)ut only a few envisioned an actual reduction.
Mr. LaCoe indicated that the tax reduction to be realized
was more apparent than real, and that it was politically inspired
rather than a matter of sound fiscal policy. About one-third of
the revenue sharing funds v;ill go for property tax relief, but
the rate of taxation v;ill decline by less than one mill as a
result of this action. The tax reduction results primarily from
the 1972 elections in v:hich two of the five seats on the Alachua
County Coirimission ;-;ere to be filled. Both winning candidates
had campaigned on the promise to use revenue sharing funds for
tax reduction. After taking office, these tv/o candidates v:ere
able to persuade a third Commissioner to join them in voting for
the tax cut.
Alachua County has not decided on the exact use of the
remaining two-thirds of the revenue sharing funds, but it is
expected that the money v;ill be spent primarily on capital
expenditures, mostly road construction and maintenance,
Huntsville, Alabama (population 137,802)
Person interviev/ed: Mayor Joseph Davis
Date of interviev;: December 22, 1972
Kuntsville is a city that has experienced phenomenal
grov;th since V/orld V/ar II. Ten years ago the population was
about 70,000 and twenty years ago, about 15,000, This grov;th
has resulted in a tremendous expansion of governm.ental services.
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Tlio tnx bnro han alf,o grov:n accord ^n^^ly , no tho city har. bfrn
able to cope fairly v;ell \-:llh It:: oxpanr.lon.
lluntcville han not yet decided ?:iov; Itn funds v;lll be
ujcd, but there v.'ill be no jjroperty tax reduction. The city
seeniG to be takinn; its time before makinr; any definite coranit-
ment^
.
In the meantime the money has been deposited in an In-
terest-bearinp; account, where it v/ill probably remain a year or
so before being used.
Hartselle, Alabama (population 7,355)
Person interviev:ed : Ms. Sarah S. Keseker, City Clerk
Date of interviev;:- December 26, 1972
Harrselle plans to avoid using any funds for programs
of a i^ontlnuing nature. Funds from the first t\;o checks are
to be used for street improvement, a nev; road grader, and a
nevj dump truck.
Mrs. Keseker had recently attended a regional meeting
in Atlanta, Georgia, held by officials of the Office of Revenue
Sharing, a new division of the Treasury Department. Officials
of local governments v/ere advised to proceed on the assumption
that revenue sharing would terminate at the end of the first
five year period. This seemed to be based on conservative man-
agement rather than on any specific Information as to the future
of revenue sharing. Mrs. PCeseker stated that there seems to be
a general mood among city and tovrn officials that revenue sharing
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will afford a brea^he^ for five yearc, and after that everyone
will be on his owr:,
Decatur, Alabama (population 38, 0^^)
Person interviewed: Mayor Russell Holding
Date of interview; December 26, 1972
The Mayor said that there was no intention to reduce
taxes through the. use of revenue sharing funds. Decatur has a
very moderate tax rate and there is no clamor by the citizens
there to cut taxes using these funds. The money for the first
two checks are not to be placed in the general revenues budget,
but will be shown as a supplement to the regular budget. The
funds are to be used for upgrading presently underfunded depart-
ments, primarily in the area of capital expenditures for street
improvements, new fire department equipment, and drainage projects.
Some of the money, hov;ever, v;ill be applied to programs of a
continuing nature. The Mayor is v/ary of funding permanent-type
programs with revenue sharing funds, but believes this is necessary
to some extent.
Tucson, Arizona (population 262,933)
Person interviewed: Mr. Clifford V/. O'key, City Manager
Date of interviev;: January 3, 1973
Tucson will use all of its revenue sharing funds from
the first two checks (about $^,000,000) for the improvement of
streets. Pending project design and the avmrding of contracts,
the money has been invested in a trust fund at 6 percent interest.
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The City Manager stated that Tucson would definitely
avoid committing revenue sharing funds to programs of a con-
tinuing nature. Funds in the remaining four years of the
program will be committed to capital expenditures, primarily
street improvements and sev;age systems. No tax reduction is
envisioned. Tucson sees the opportunity to finance street im-
provements that v/ould have otherwise have been postponed for a
long time, and this is considered more pressing than a tax cut.
Sante Fe, New Mexico (population ^1,16?)
Person interviewed: Mr. Antonio Lopez, City Finance Director
Date of interview: January M, 1973
Sane Fe is a city v;ith a rather stable population. Its
problems are mostly those of an older city, rather than those of
a rapidly expanding community. The city has made no definite
plans for using its revenue sharing funds, but there will be no
tax cut. Programs of a permanent nature will be avoided as much
as possible. Sane Fe intends to wait several months before
making a decision concerning use of this money. The city wants
to be sure that funds from other Federal programs are going to
remain intact before it commits itself on the revenue sharing
funds
.
East Granby, Connecticut (population 3,532)
Person interviev/ed: Mr. V/illiam Meyer, First Selectman
Date of interview: January 19, 1973
East Granby is a small town situated halfway betv;-een
Hartford and Springfield, Massachusetts. Mj?. Meyer stated
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t!:';t- v". '•;'!;* rev--rjU'- r.h:.ir L'l.r rund:: , a local property lax in-
ci'e-ioe would liave been riece^w->ary . V.'itti tiit,':-:e fundL;, the tax
rate v/111 be held at the prooent level, or possibly reduced
by about one nlll.
The town has plans to use revenue sharing funds for cap-
ital expenditures that had already been planned. These include
a new truck for road construction, a new police cruiser, and
land fill scales for tlie town dump. East Granby is skeptical
about the lon^ range future of the revenue sharing program.
Suffield, Connecticut (population 8,63^)
Person interviev;ed : Mr. Daniel Sullivan, First Selectman
Date of interview: January 19, 1973
Mr. Sullivan also asserted that a tax increase v/ould have
been necessary had revenue sharing not been adopted. Taxes
v;ill not be reduced, but the anticipated increase v;ill not take
place. The tov:n'3 funds -will be used to finance capital ex-
penditures that v;ere already planned. These expenditures in-
clude money for a nev; garage, a drainage system, and partial
funding of a nev; bridge.
V/indsor Locks, Connecticut (population 15,080)
Person Intervievred : Mrs. Irma M. Olivi, Tov/n Clerk, January 19,
1973
V/indsor Locks plans to use about half of its funds for
bond reduction, a reflection of the skepticism with which it
vie-ws tlie futur:e of revenue sharing. The remaining half will
be used for capital expenditures, although the specific programs
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have not yet boon celocted. Mrc . Olivl credits revenue nharinc
for having stabilized the local tax situation, but states that
the tov/n is proceeding': on the assumption that this is only a
temporary source of funds.
Granby, Connecticut
Person ini;erviev;ed : rir. Donald Flannery, Chief Administration
Officer
Date interviev;ed : January 19, 1973
For the time being Granby has Invested its money in an
interest-bearing trust fund. Plans call for spending the money
in about a year. The funds ivill be used for the purchase of new
radio equipment for police and tov;n trucks, addition of another
patrolman to the town police force, and partial financing of a
new library. Mr. Flannery credits revenue sharing for allov/ing
the tov;n to maintain its present level of property taxation.
Simsbury, Connecticut (population 17,^57)
Person interviev.-ed: Mr. Russell Shaw, First Selectman
Date of interviev;: January 26, 1973
Simsbury is a very affluent town, a suburban commuter
area north of Hartford. Simsbury 's planned use of revenue
sharing funds is in marked contrast to the plans of most officials
intervlev.'crd . It v/ill use most of its funds to finance nev; pro-
grams of a continuing nature. Very little will be spent on
capital improvements and none at all for tax reduction. The
nev; programs to be funded Include enlargement of the police
department staff, hiring of additional em.ployees for the highv;ay
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dopartr.ent, and liirlnc of a nov; finance director. Thone prorrarr.n
v.'lll reiuiro continuouG fundiri:-;:, v.'rioth'jr or not revenue nluirinc
in extended after flv(? yours.
Torrinnton, Connecticut (population 31,952)
Per;?(m intorvlev;ed : Kayor Frederick Daley
Date of interview: January 26, 1973
Mr. Daley plan.i to use Tcrrinrton' s money for capital
expenditures that v/ere already planned. He states that these
programs would have been accomplished eventually anyway, but
that revenue sharing has enabled the tov/n to speed up its schedule
for completing th'em. The funds v;ill be used for a new garage,
expansion of storm and sanitary sev;ers, and bridge and highv/ay
repairs. IJo money will be applied toward a tax redaction.
Chicopee, Hasachusetts (population 66,676)
Person interviev;ed : Mr. Norman J. Ritchott, City Auditor
Date of interview: February 2, 1973
Mr. Ritchott explained that without revenue sharing
funds the city of Chicopee would have experienced a substantial
tax Increase. An estimated tv;o-thirds of the funds will go for
tax stabilization, and the remainder will be used for capital ex-
penditures in the public safety, environmental protection and
public transportation areas.
The city realizes that if revenue sharing is terminated
five years from now, there will have to be a property tax increase.

Tiivi-Q lo come concei-n t'nul a tax iricr*--aje may be nocev>Din'y in
the n-'\ar future If Fodoral fundinr- of other vrorrnr:.:: Ic curtall<'d,
QG the ruir.or-inlllG succest.
Manchester, Connecticut (population ^7,99^0
Person interviewed: Mr. Thomas Moore, Comptroller
Date of interviov; : February 2, 1973
The city of Manchester is using its revenue sharing
funds for an unusual type of investment. There has been increasing
concern that the city's shopping area is losing too much business
to neighboring tov/ns, especially Hartford, due to its poor ac-
cessibility. Therefore, Manchester intends to revitalize the
main shopping area by spending its revenue sharing money for nev:
3idev;alks and highv/ay improvem.ents . The city feels that improving
both automobile and pedestrian access to the shopping pr-pa'^ will
yield long range business and tax benefits that make this invest-
ment attractive. There had been some consideration of floating
a bond issue to finance this project, but the receipt of revenue
sharing funds has obviated this necessity.
Brattleboro, Vermont (population 12,239)
Person interviev;ed : Mr. Corv;in S. Elv/ell, City Manager
,e of interviev; : February 2, 197 3r>-, i-
,
Mr. Elv.'ell explained that all tov;ns in Verr.ont are re-
quired by a recent state lav; to change to a fiscal year accounting
systeip (July 1-June 30) no later than July 1, 1977. V/henever the
shift to this nev; system is made, it villi be necessary for the

rirr.t buflret to covtT an l6 irionth period, January throurli June,
plur. the r:ev; flc.cal year. 'Ar , IClv/ell ceec revenue charlrif: a::;
the perfect vehicle for Brattleboro to u::e in makinc the chanr.e-
over. Therefore, the tov;n hac adopted a plan for making thic
chance on July 1, 1973, and a budcet has been submitted that v;lll
span Lhe period January 1, 1973 - June 30, 197^. All the rev-
enue sharing funds to be received by the city during this period
will be used to cover the extra six months.
For the years of revenue sharing remaining after this
budgetary shift has been completed, the town will probably use
its funds for capital expenditures. It does not expect the
program to become permanent.
\7oodstock, Vermont (population 2,6o8)
Person interviev;ed: Mr. Sidney C. Smith, City Manager
Date of interview: February 2, 1973
Mr. Smith stated that the town of Woodstock plans to
use all of its revenue sharing funds on capital expenditures,
primarily a new fire station. Woodstock, like most tov/ns, v/ants
to avoid any new continuing programs in the event the revenue
sharing program is not extended after five years.
The village of V/oodstock, a separate governmental entity,
but one with which Mr. Smith is familiar, plans to use about
half of its funds for the reduction of property taxes. The tovm
of V.'oodstock will use none of its funds for this purpose.
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Concord, liew Hanipjhlre (population 30,022)
Per-on Intervl ev/'-^d : Krz . M-irJoric B. Koote, City Clerk
Date of interviev;: FeLruary 2, 1973
Mrs. Foote explained that Concord i:- not nettinr, a.; mucii
money as originally expected. Like most other cities. Concord
plane to ur>o itr, r-oncy for nonrecurrinr; expenses. This is to be
accomplished by applying the money to the current budget to pay
for capital expenditures already planned. There will be no new
programs. Concord v;ould definitely have had an increase in the
property tax if revenue sharing funds had not been received.
New Hampshire is the only state in the U.S. v;ith no broad based
source of revenue, except for a state lottery and some minor
business taxes. It has neither a statev/ide sales tax nor a
general income tax. As such, the cities in the state do not
participate in the sharing of sales tax revenues as do many
cities of states having this kind of tax.
Concord considers that revenue sharing has been of immense
value to the city in allov;ing it to meet its obligations v;ithout
a property tax increase.
East Hartford, Connecticut (population 57,583)
Person interviev:ed : Mayor Richard Blackstone
Date of interviev/: February 21, 1973
Surprisingly, Mr. Blackstone stated that East Hartford
has no real need for revenue sharing funds. East Hartford is a
city v;ith a lot of heavy industry, and a substantial amount of
revenue is derived from this source. The city has one of the
lowest t:~'" ^'i":o -.n the state, V7ith a 65 percent level of evaluation
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nd a 42.5 mlllage rate. Even though It enjoys this low tax
rate (low for Connecticut), East Hartford will use part of its
revenue sharing funds for a tax reduction of 3-5 mills. There
are no particular plans at the present time for the remainder of
the money, but it will go for capital expenditures. A portion
of it may be used for the purchase of police and fire department
equipment. Until definite plans are made, the money will remain
in an interest-bearing account.
New Haven, Connecticut (population 137,707)
Person interviewed: Mr. Everett Shaw, Director of the
Planning and City Development Commission
Date of interview: February 21, 1973
New Haven is particularly worried about the possibility
of cutbacks in ether Federal programs. This Interview was con-
ducted at the time that much publicity was being drawn to the
subject of revenue sharing as a means of effecting a reduction
of grant-in-aid programs, etc. Mr. Shaw stated that revenue
sharing funds are badly needed for New Haven to meet its respon-
sibilities without a tax increase. The city already has one of
the highest rates of taxation in the state.
Until the overall subject of Federal funding is clarified,
the city is making no definite plans for the expenditure of
funds. Hovjever, a decision will be necessary before the new
fiscal year begins in July if a tax increase is to be avoided.
Revenue sharing funds v;ill definitely not be used for a tax cut.
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V.'e the re field, Connecticut (population 26,662)
?er\-.o;i :I ntv,-rvi<''..'>.-cl : ."r. I\:ilvih De.-,antic, Tcvm Manacer
Date of intervi'^v;: February 21, 1973
i-'.r
. De.:anti3 door, not believe t\i'dt revenue charinc <ie-
servoG all the favorable publicity it hae been receiving. He
oee;3 the v;hole proj^rari as an incidiouc plan to cut back Federal
prof^rams in other areas, with revenue sharing being used as a
smokescreen. He also fears that the regulations applying to
the revenue sharing program v/ill grov/
.
Despite this pessimism (or perhaps realism), Mr. Desantis
credits the present receipts for stabiliziiig the town's budget.
VJethersf ield has a high tax effort, one of the factors in the
distribution formula, and as a result is receiving more m.oney
than most tov;ns its size. The budget includes a relatively high
level of capital expenditures, so revenue sharing funds v/ill be
directed tov:ard this usage.
Hartford, Connecticut (.population 158,017)
Person interviev/ed : I'ir . Euv;ard M. Curtin, City Manager
Date interviev;ed : February 21, 1973
Hartford is using part of its revenue sharing funds to
im.prove the planning and m.anagerial functions of the city gov-
ernment. This money v;ill underv:rite the cost of initiating a
long-range financial planning unit which v;ill m.onitor cash flows,
establish invo:-tm.ent schedules for the city treasurer, and perform
lonp;-range financial planning. An additional senior analyst will
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be hired tvO ntudy fne canli-flow problenu: in an effor't to relieve
the internal audit staff. This procram is obvlou:>ly one of a
continuing:; nature.
Some of the remaininc funds v/ill be used for capital ex-
penditures, pi'ii.'iai'ily equipment for the fire and police depart-
ments. A portion of the money .v;ill be used in various adminis-
tration areas, particularly in the police department. At least
half of the total revenue sharing funds v;ill be used for programs
that will require continuous funding. Hartford is giving par-
ticular emiphasis to expanding and improving the police depart-
ment and for upgrading the quality of city management. No rev-
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